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THE PARADOX OF "ABSTRACT IDEAS"
Alan L. Durham*

I. INTRODUCTION
An enduring principle of intellectual property law is that one cannot patent an
abstract idea. It was true in 1854, when the Supreme Court denied Samuel Morse,
inventor of the telegraph, a patent claim that would have covered any means of
using electromagnetism to transmit printed messages.' It was still true in 2010,
when, in the much anticipated Bilski v. Kappos case,2 the Supreme Court held that
a method of hedging risks in commodities sales transactions was not patentable
subject matter.3 The abstract ideas exclusion is one of the few categorical
limitations of patentable subject matter,4 and it stands now as an important restraint
on the growth of intellectual property rights in business methods and computer
programming.5 Yet, in an important sense, every patent claims an abstract idea.
The subject matter of a patent is an invention. An invention is a concept-an idea
for new technology. What, then, do courts mean when they hold that abstract ideas
are ineligible for patenting?
Concurring in Bilski, Justice Stevens complained that the majority "never
provides a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea." 6
Indeed, the 150 years of precedent to which Bilski alludes' provides no such
"satisfying account." The history of the abstract ideas exclusion is one of circular
reasoning, vagueness, and obscurity, in part because courts rarely acknowledge the
inherently abstract qualities of any patented invention. Adding to the confusion,
the deceptively simple proposition that abstract ideas cannot be patented has been
used to address a number of interrelated but ultimately distinct concerns. These
include (1) whether the invention consists of natural phenomena devoid of novelty

V 2011 Alan L. Durham, Judge Robert S. Vance Professor of Law, University of
Alabama School of Law; J.D. 1988, University of California, Berkeley. I would like to
thank Dean Kenneth Randall and the University of Alabama Law School Foundation for
their support of this research.
See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 119-20 (1854).
2 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
3

See id. at 3231.

4 Reviewing

those limitations, Burk and Lemley call the exclusion of abstract ideas
the "most significant" exception. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent
Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1642 (2003).
5 See
id. at 1618-22.
6Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring).
7 The Court notes that non-textual exceptions to patentable subject matter, including
the prohibition on patenting abstract ideas, "have defined the reach of the statute . . . going

back 150 years." Id. at 3225.
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or human agency; (2) whether the invention is so remote from practical application
that it lacks utility; (3) whether the property right conferred by a broad claim
would be disproportionate to the patentee's contribution to the art; and (4) whether
the invention lies in an area of human activity (e.g., business or law) that lacks the
tangible characteristics of conventional technology.
Do any or all of these represent the distinguishing characteristics of an
"abstract idea"? There is no clear answer-a point vividly illustrated by In re
Ferguson,8 a 2009 Federal Circuit case involving a claimed "paradigm" for selling
software from a variety of suppliers through a single marketing entity.9 What the
panel majority called "quite literally . . . the paradigmatic abstract idea,"10 the

concurring judge labeled "not at all abstract.""
Few issues in patent law are as pressing as the availability of exclusive rights
in fields such as biotechnology, computer programming, communications, and
business, that stretch the boundaries of technology as traditionally conceived. The
consequences are too important to leave to ill-defined gatekeepers. Abstractness is
a creature of many forms, and the law could be usefully clarified by distinguishing
among them. Moreover, some of the concerns addressed by denying patents to
abstract ideas could be addressed through means other than patentable subject
matter-means that account for the abstractness that is, to a degree, a characteristic
of all patented inventions.
Part II summarizes the basic limitations on patentable subject matter
expressed in the language of the Patent Act. Part III examines the emergence in the
nineteenth century of the abstract ideas exclusion as a means to ensure that
patentees would not monopolize the forces of nature. Courts in this era
concentrated on the separation of principle from application-a distinction that
endures today. The nineteenth century also gave birth to the cryptic notion that no
one can patent an "idea." Part IV considers the role of abstract ideas in the patent
cases of the twentieth century, as courts adapted traditional doctrines to the
technologies of the information age. Here, courts struggled with mathematical
algorithms, computer software, and business methods, at first using the abstract
ideas prohibition to restrict patents to more conventional areas of technology, but
eventually conceding that the patent system should play a role in the information
economy. Part V takes us to the twenty-first century, marked by attempts to scale
back the liberal interpretation of patentable subject matter characteristic of the
preceding decades. The Federal Circuit, with stricter formulas for identifying
patentable subject matter, reasserted the importance of tangibility, only to be
8 558

F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
'Id. at 1361.
0 Id. at 1366 (internal quotation marks omitted).
' Id. at 1367 (Newman, J., concurring). The Federal Circuit's Bilski opinion presents
a similar contrast, Judge Rader maintaining that "the hedging claim at stake in this appeal
is a classic example of abstractness," In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(Rader, J., dissenting), while Judge Newman concludes that "this is not a fundamental
principle or an abstract idea." Id. at 995 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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reversed by the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos.12 Part VI explores the paradox
that dwells in the abstract ideas exclusion, the confusion that stems from its
multiple dimensions, and the prospects for a clearer approach.
II. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
In order to "promote the Progress of ... [the] useful Arts," the Constitution of
the United States allows Congress to secure to inventors, for limited times, the
exclusive right to their discoveries.13 A patentable invention must be new, useful,
and non-obvious, 14 and the patent must include a detailed disclosure that enables
persons skilled in the art to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation.15 Today, the exclusive rights afforded the patentee include the
right to make, use, sell, offer to sell, and import the patented invention.16 Generally
those rights end twenty years after the filing date of the patent application.'
"[U]seful Arts" is an eighteenth century term equivalent to "technology."' 8
Patents promote advancements in technology by allowing inventors to reap the
financial rewards of their endeavors during the period of exclusivity. The promise
of reward leads to further investments and risk-taking.' 9 Although patents restrict
the use of technological achievements during their term, the encouragement of
invention has "a positive effect on society through the introduction of new
products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by
way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens." 20
The first Patent Act was that of 1790.21 Important revisions followed in
1793, 1836,23 and 1952. One of the most significant changes, introduced in the
Act of 1836, is the requirement that the applicant provide claims detailing the

130 S. Ct. 3218.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("new and useful"); id. § 102 (novelty in comparison to
prior art); id. §103 (nonobviousness).
15 Id. § 112; Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(no "undue experimentation").
16 See 35 U.S.C. §271.
7
Id. § 154(a)(2).
12

18

See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarificationof the Patent Clause of the

U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 (1949) ("The term 'useful arts' as used in
the Constitution ... is best represented in modem language by the word 'technology."').
'9 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) ("The patent monopoly was
not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a
reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.").
20 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicrotr Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
21 Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
22 Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
23 Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
24 The current Patent Act is a revised version of the 1952 Act. See Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).
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invention covered by the patent.25 In earlier times, it fell to the more general
written description of the invention-today's patent "specification"-to describe
and distinguish what it was the patentee had contributed to the art.26 Now it is the
role of the claims to establish the "metes and bounds" of the patented invention. 27
The claims define the invention for purposes of examination and comparison to the
prior art, and a court compares the claims to an accused product or process to
determine if it infringes. 28
Each patent act has limited the types of invention eligible for patenting. The
act of 1790 defined patentable subject matter as "any useful art, manufacture,
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or
used." 29 The act of 1793 changed the wording somewhat, deleting "engine" and
"device," and adding "composition of matter." 30 Little has changed since then,
other than the substitution of the word "process" for "art." 3 ' The current statute
reads: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title." 32
The words used to define patentable subject matter are deliberately broad.
The term "machine" embraces "every mechanical device or combination of
mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain
effect or result." 34 "Manufacture" includes any tangible thing made by the

See Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. at 119. Today's Patent Act states that the patent
must "conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112.
26 The Patent Act of 1793 provides that "every inventor, before he can receive a
patent shall .. . deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or
process of compounding the same, in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the
same from all other things before known . . . ."Patent Act of 1793 § 3.
25

27

Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(claim language construed, then compared to the prior art); Techsearch, L.L.C. v. Intel
28

Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (infringement determined by construing the
claims, then comparing them to the accused product).
29 Patent Act of 1790,1 Stat. 109, § I
(1790).
30 Patent Act of 1793§
1.
3' The substitution occurred in the 1952 Patent Act. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
32
33

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).

See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 ("In choosing such expansive terms as

'manufacture' and 'composition of matter,' modified by the comprehensive 'any,'
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.").
34 Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267 (1854); see also In re Nuijten, 500
F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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transformation of raw materials. 35 "Composition of matter" covers "all
compositions of two or more substances," no matter how they may be united or
what form they may take. The term "process" has given courts the most
difficulty;3 ' but in its ordinary sense it would include any sequence of acts.3 1 In the
often-quoted words of the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act,
the subject matter of patents includes "anything under the sun that is made by
man."
The spirit of inclusiveness reflects Thomas Jefferson's view that "ingenuity
should receive a liberal encouragement.Ao However, patentable subject matter has
never encompassed every sort of discovery one can imagine. 41 Courts have long
held that patentable subject matter does not include natural phenomena,42 natural
laws,43 or abstract ideas.44 None of these exclusions are now, or ever have been,
explicit in the patent statutes. For their origins and evolution, one must look to a
series of cases beginning in the mid-nineteenth century.
III. "ABSTRACT IDEAS" INTHE NINETEENTH CENTURY: HARNESSING THE POWERS
OF NATURE

Courts have frequently emphasized the difference between manifestations of
nature, in which no one may claim property rights, and technological innovations

35

See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308; Nuilten, 500 F.3d at 1353. In Nuijten, the

Federal Circuit held that an electrical signal lacks the tangible qualities necessary to make
it a manufacture, even though it is produced through human agency. See id. at 1356
("These definitions address 'articles' of 'manufacture' as being tangible articles or
commodities. A transient electric or electromagnetic transmission does not fit within that
definition.").
36 Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 308 (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279,
280 (D.C. Cir. 1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 See infra Part III.B.
3 See Bilski,130 S. Ct. at 3228 (discussing the ordinary meaning of "method"). The
Patent Act itself defines "process" through tautology: "the term 'process' means process,
art or method.. . ." 35 U.S.C.

§ 100(b) (2006).

" S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); see also
Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 308.
40 Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 308 (quoting 5 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 75-76 (H.
Washington ed., 1871)).
41 See id at 309 ("This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces
every discovery.").

42

Id. ("The laws of nature [and] physical phenomena . . . have been held not

patentable.").
43

Id.

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) ("Excluded from [patent] protection
are ... abstract ideas."); Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309.
44
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that are subject to patenting.45 Nature, in this context, might mean a natural
phenomenon, like the magnetic field that envelops the Earth, or a naturally
occurring substance, like a mineral rich in iron.46 Although the Patent Act defines
"invention" as "invention or discovery,"47 no one can claim the handiwork of
nature-even if, like the iron-rich mineral, it facially qualifies as a composition of
matter.48 On the other hand, one can patent new and useful technology that exploits
natural phenomena, like a new compass fashioned from the iron-rich mineral and
dependent on the Earth's magnetic field. 4 9 All inventions consist of natural
components.5 0 When an inventor transforms or arranges the natural components
into something not found in nature, the result may be a patentable invention.
The line between a natural phenomenon and an invention is relatively clear. In
the case of natural principles, the edges begin to blur. One way to describe or
classify natural phenomena is by reference to the principles that create them. We
might, for example, describe rainbows as the class of phenomena produced by the
laws of refraction under certain environmental conditions. The laws of refraction
are, in a sense, as much a part of nature as the rainbows themselves. Like the
rainbows, they cannot be claimed as property. Inventions also operate according to
natural principles, and the most convenient way to describe an invention may be by
referring to those principles. The inventor of a compass, for example, might refer
to the natural propensity of magnetized iron to align itself with the Earth's
magnetic field. Here disentangling nature and invention is a difficult proposition.
In the nineteenth century, courts dealt with the problem by distinguishing between
natural principles "in the abstract" and useful applications of those principles.
The following section further examines limitations on patentability. Section A
discusses the separation of principles of nature from their technological.
applications. Section B considers the special case of processes, which lack the
concreteness of tangible machines and compositions of matter. Section C examines

45 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403
F.3d 1331, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
46 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 ("[A] new mineral discovered in the earth or a new
plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.").
47 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2006) (emphasis added). The Constitution also refers to the
"discoveries" secured to inventors. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48 See Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
49 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 ("It is now commonplace that an application of a law of
nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of
patent protection.").
5o See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161-62 (4th Cir.
1958) ("All of the tangible things with which man deals and for which patent protection is
granted are products of nature in the sense that nature provides the basic source materials.
The 'matter' of which patentable new and useful compositions are composed necessarily
includes naturally existing elements and materials.").
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the "doctrine of equivalents," which, contrary to the tenet that principles cannot be
patented, elevates the principle of the patented invention above the explicit
limitations of the claim. Finally, Section D discusses the origins of the puzzling but
enduring notion that an "idea" cannot be patented.
A. Principleand Application
Le Roy v. Tathams1 decided in 1853, concerned the discovery that pieces of

solid lead could be forced to bond tightly under extreme heat and pressure, a
technique used by the patentee in the manufacture of lead pipe.5 2 Discussing the
validity of the patent, the Court began with the proposition that "a principle is not
patentable" 53-a well-established maxim at the time, but one marred by "a want of
precision" in the use of the word "principle" by courts and scholars.54 The Court
explained that "[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original
cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right."55 Likewise, no one can claim rights to any "power in nature,"
such as the power of steam or electricity.56 Therefore, the property of lead that
causes it to adhere under heat and pressure cannot be patented.
On the other hand, a machine that applies the powers of nature to useful ends
may be patented. The machine must be new,ss and the patent must extend only to
machines that "use the same mechanical power, or one that shall be substantially
the same." 59 A patent covering any machine that achieved the same effect, or a
patent covering the result of a process, would be invalid. 60 Rights prohibiting
others from accomplishing the same ends "by any means whatsoever" would
"discourage arts and manufactures, against the avowed policy of the patent laws."
In Le Roy, the patent-in-suit claimed only the machinery used by the inventor in

5'

5

55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853).

2 Id. at 173.

5 Id. at 175; see also Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1864) (finding in
the law "no authority to grant a patent for a 'principle' or a 'mode of operation,' or an idea,
or any other abstraction").
54
LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 174.
5
1 d. at 175.

Id.
5 Id.
5 Although

56

it may be "new" only in the sense that it constitutes a new arrangement of
existing parts. Id.
5 Id. The Court is less clear on the patentability of a new process, but the same
reasoning seems to apply.
60 Id.; see also Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1854) ("It is for the
discovery or invention of some practicable method or means of producing a beneficial
result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for the result or effect itself.").
61

Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175.
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the pipe-making process, and because the machinery itself was not new the patent
could not be sustained.62
Justice Nelson, writing in dissent, concluded that the patent did not cover only
the machinery, but extended to the "employment of the newly-discovered property
in the metal, and the practical adaption of it, by these means, to the production of a
new result, namely, the manufacture of wrought pipe out of solid lead."63 Is a new
adaptation of natural property a discovery eligible for a patent? Justice Nelson
echoed the majority's distinction between unpatentable principles and practical
applications. Quoting Boulton v. Bull, 64 an English case concerning Watt's
improvements to the steam engine, Nelson linked the application of a principle to
its association with physical effects, corporeal substances, and the useful arts:
"there can be no patent for a mere principle[,]but for a principle[]so far embodied
and connected with corporeal substances as to be in a condition to act, and to
produce effects in any art, trade, mystery, or manual occupation, I think there may
be a patent." 6 5 Watt's invention was neither an "abstract notion," nor a "patent for
a principle," but instead was a practical means of improving the efficiency of
steam engines by insulating the steam vessel and condensing the steam
separately.66 When a principle is thus "turned to account, to a practical object, and
applied to a special result," it is no longer a principle in the abstract. 67 Application
of the natural properties of lead to the formation of manufactured goods should
qualify, in Judge Nelson's view, as a patentable invention.
Another early milestone in the history of patentable subject matter is O'Reilly
v. Morse.6 9 Although Morse had invented the telegraph and the code that bears his
name, the eighth claim of his patent reached further-embracing any use of
electromagnetism for printing messages over any distance, by any means. 70

62

Id. at 176-77.

Id. at 183 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
6 Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 463, 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P. 1795).
65 Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 183 (quoting Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 463, 495, 126 Eng. Rep.
651, 667) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66 id.
67 Id. at 185 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
68 Nelson stressed that one who discovers means to apply a principle to practical ends
is "entitled to protection against all other modes of carrying the same principle or property
into practice for obtaining the same effect or result"-in this case, any machinery to exploit
the same properties of lead. Id. at 185. That other machinery might be employed "only
shows the beauty and simplicity, and comprehensiveness of the invention." Id at 186
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The means, Nelson wrote, "are but
63

incidental . . . flowing naturally from the original conception." Id. at 187. Where the

patentee must be limited is in applying the principle to a specific end. "For every other
purpose and end, the principle is free for all mankind to use." Id.
69 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854).
70 Id. at 112. Morse stated:
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Morse's claim reveals the ambiguity in Le Roy. Is this a claim to an "effect," or to
a practical application of natural forces? The breadth of the claim, and its potential
to hinder the work of future inventors, persuaded the majority of the Court to hold
it unpatentable. As the Court observed:
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or
machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we now know some
future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of
writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic
current, without using any part of the process or combination set forth in
the plaintiffs specification. His invention may be less complicated-less
liable to get out of order-less expensive in construction, and in its
operation. But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not
use it, nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission of this
patentee. 7 1
The Court did not dispute that Morse had invented subject matter he could
patent.72 But he was not entitled to claim all means to the same end, even those
employing the same natural forces, thereby "shut[ting] the door against inventions
of other persons" who might reveal new ways to exploit electromagnetism. 73 One
who applies a principle to practical ends must "speciqy] the means he uses," and
74
his patent is limited to those means.
On the other hand, the Court did not dismiss the possibility that, in the proper
case, the "means" employed by the patentee might be broadly defined. The Court
referred to the English case of Nielson v. Harford," concerning Nielson's
discovery that a furnace could be made more efficient if the air introduced into the
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of
machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of
my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic
current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or
printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new
application of that power of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
n1Id. at 113.
72 As the Court explained:
[I]t is the high praise of Professor Morse, that he has been able, by a new
combination of known powers, of which electro-magnetism is one, to discover a
method by which intelligible marks or signs may be printed at a distance. And
for the method or process thus discovered, he is entitled to a patent.
Id. at 117-18.
7 Id. at 113.
74 Id.
at 119.
7 (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266 (Exch. of Pleas); 8 Meeson & Welsby 806.
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combustion chamber were heated first in a separate vessel. Nielson did not specify
the form of the vessel or the manner in which it would be heated, details he
considered immaterial. In spite of the breadth of his patent, the English court
concluded that Nielson claimed a machine, not a principle. The Court in Morse
approved that conclusion. Although Nielson could not patent the discovery that hot
air promotes ignition,77 he could patent the use of that principle to improve
combustion efficiency by pre-heating the air. This was an effect produced "in
greater or less degree" regardless of the heating vessel; "[t]he interposition of a
heated receptacle, in any form, was the novelty he invented."78 In contrast, Morse
had not discovered that electromagnetism always served to transmit messages at a
distance. Success depended on the machinery.79
While Morse and Le Roy are both instructive, obscurity in the meaning of
"principle" persists. Natural forces like electromagnetism, or observed truths about
the workings of nature, cannot be patented. Applications of nature to useful ends
may be patented if the claims are sufficiently limited. The question is how limited
they must be. The more one describes an invention in terms of natural principles,
the broader and more generalized the claim becomes. In some cases, like
Nielson's, that may be justified, the details of implementation being incidental. In
other cases, like Morse's, the claim exceeds the bounds of the inventor's
contribution to the art.
B. Arts and Processes
80
Courts in the same era held that processes are patentable subject matter.
Even if a process does not require new machinery, it can still qualify as "a
practicable . . . means of producing a beneficial result or effect," 8' falling on the
safe side of the principle/application divide. Cochrane v. Deener,82 for example,

76

See Morse, 56 U.S. at 115.
n Id. at 116 ("[B]ecause the discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical
science, is not patentable.").
78 Id
79 Id. at 117. Justice Grier took a different view. His dissent characterizes Morse's
discovery as the use of electromagnetism to transmit intelligible characters at a distance.
This constituted his "whole invention, and nothing more." Id at 134-35 (Grier, J.,
dissenting). If the "essence" of Morse's invention consisted of "compelling this hitherto
useless element" to perform a practical task, how, Grier asked, could it be argued that
Morse had claimed "a principle or an abstraction?" Id at 135. As for the breadth of
Morse's disputed claim, Grier found that it accurately reflected his discovery and should be
limited only if it encompassed subject matter previously known. Id.
80
8 1 See, e.g., Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 254 (1854).
Id. at 268.
82

94 U.S. 780 (1877).
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concerned a method of separating and grinding middlings to produce a superior
flour, a process "not limited to any special arrangement of machinery."83
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of
the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed.

. .

. A process is a mode of

treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a
series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and
reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just. as
patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it

is an art. 84
Similarly, the Court in Tilghman v. Proctor85 held that the inventor could patent a
method of dissolving oily materials in water under high temperature and pressure,
even though the claims left out many details of the method and apparatus. 86 As in
Cochrane, the Court expressed "no doubt" that a patent could be granted for a
process; "[a] manufacturing process is clearly an art, within the meaning of the
law."87 Although the apparatus disclosed in Tilghman's specification was not the
best to carry out the method he claimed, the same had been said of Nielson's
apparatus.88 What mattered was that each had invented a practical "means" to
achieve a useful result.89 Where Morse had gone wrong was in claiming "a mere
principle," in the form of the "exclusive use of one of the powers of nature for a
particular purpose." 90 His was "not a claim of any particular machinery, nor a
claim of any particular process for utilizing the power; but a claim of the power
itself."91
Although, in the end, both machines and processes can serve as means to
apply the forces of nature, the patentability of the former was more obvious to the
courts of the nineteenth century. "A machine is a concrete thing, consisting of
parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices.

8

. .

. A machine is not a

1Id. at 785.

84

8
86
87

Id. at 787-88.

102 U.S. 707 (1881).
Id at 723-24.
Id. at 722.

" Id. at 723-24.
89

See id. at 728.

Id. at 726.
9' Id. at 726-27. Looking at the majority opinion in Morse, one could conclude that it
was more about the adequacy of the disclosure than whether the challenged claim was
patentable subject matter. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1346
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (pointing out that Morse can be interpreted as a written
description case). In Tilghman, however, the Court clearly sees Morse, like Le Roy, as a
case about the patentability of an abstract principle. Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 707. Some
scholars call Morse the origin of the abstract ideas exclusion. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley,
supra note 4, at 1642 ("The rule originated in the case of O'Reilly v. Morse.").
90
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principle or an idea." 92 Processes, on the other hand, evoke a number of cryptic
statements suggesting that they present a more doubtful case. For example, in
Corning v. Burden,93 the Court observed that a process "is usually the result of
discovery; a machine, of invention." 94 In Tilghman, the Court described a machine

as a thing "visible to the eye" and "an object of perpetual observation." 9 5 In
contrast, it called a process "a conception of the mind, seen only by its effects
when being executed or performed." 9 6
In Corning, the Court specifically warned that processes characterized
"subjectively or passively as applied to the material operated upon," do not
constitute patentable subject matter.97 Examples include when "we say that a board
is undergoing the process of being planed, grain of being ground, iron of being
hammered."98 This echoes the statement in Le Roy that one cannot claim as one's
invention all means to achieve a particular effect or result. Such a claim is too
broad or "abstract."9 9 A claim to a machine can suffer that defect (e.g., a claim to
any machine that serves to transmit messages). 0 0 Yet process claims may be more

Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1864).
93 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252 (1854).
94 Id. at 267. The point seems to be that the "invention" of a machine brings, through
human ingenuity, a new thing into the world; the "discovery" of a process merely reveals
the potential inherent in the machines we already possess. In The Telephone Cases, 126
U.S. 1 (1888), the Court drew a similar distinction regarding Alexander Graham Bell's
"invention" and "discovery." Electricity, the Court observed, is "one of the forces of
nature," but "left to itself, [it] will not do what is wanted." Id. at 532. Researchers believed
that electricity could be harnessed to transmit the vibrations in the air caused by speech.
"Bell discovered that it could be done by gradually changing the intensity of a continuous
electric current, so as to make it correspond exactly to the changes in the density of the air
caused by the sound of the voice." Id. Having discovered the "art," Bell "then devised a
way in which these changes of intensity could be made and speech actually transmitted."
Id. at 532-33. In this instance, "both discovery and invention, in the popular sense of those
terms, were involved; discovery in finding the art, and invention in devising the means of
making it useful." Id. at 533.
Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 728.
96 Id The meaning is uncertain. A process is more transient than a machine; generally
one can observe a machine at one's leisure and a process only while it is ongoing. Yet it is
odd to say that an industrial process is a "conception of the mind," as though it took place
only in the imagination of the observer. That a process is a "conception of the mind" is a
conclusion repeated more than a century later in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589
(1978). Because both processes and principles are "conceptions of the mind, seen only by
[their] effects when being executed or performed" the line between them is "not always
clear." Id. (quoting Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 728).
" 56 U.S. at 268.
92

98 Id

9 See id. ("[I]t is well settled that a man cannot have a patent for the function or

abstract effect of a machine.").
100 In Fuller v. Yentzer, the Court wrote:
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prone to it, simply because the steps of a process are often described as the
accomplishment of a series of intermediate goals, as a recipe might direct one to
raise the temperature of the oven to 350 degrees, combine the dry ingredients,
separate the eggs, and so forth. Each step is an act, but characterized in terms of
the effect achieved. In this sense, process claims may be more abstract.
C. The DoctrineofEquivalents

Only ten days after issuing its opinion in Morse, the Supreme Court produced
0 The patent at issue
another* landmark patent decision: Winans v. Denmead.o'
claimed a railroad car shaped like the frustum of a cone.10 2 The design
accommodated heavy loads by distributing their weight, and it facilitated the
discharge of cargo through an opening at the bottom of the car.' 0 3 The railroad car
charged with infringing the patent was octagonal in cross-section, not circular as
the claims required.10 4 But because the octagonal shape achieved much of the same
benefit, it could still infringe. As the Court explained:
It is generally true, when a patentee describes a machine, and then
claims it as described, that he is understood to intend to claim, and does
by law actually cover, not only the precise forms he has described, but all
other forms which embody his invention; it being a familiar rule that, to
copy the principle or mode of operation described, is an infringement,
although such copy should be totally unlike the original in form or
proportions. os
In 1853, the Court wrote that "a principle is not patentable;"' 06 now, in 1854,
it invokes the "familiar rule" that, whatever the claims may specify, copying the
"principle" of a patent is enough to infringe.'07 As the Court warned in Le Roy, the

Patents for a machine will not be sustained if the claim is for a result, the
established rule being that the invention, if any, within the meaning of the Patent
Act, consists in the means or apparatus by which the result is obtained, and not
merely in the mode of operation independent of the mechanical devices
employed; nor will a patent be held valid for a principle or for an idea, or any
other mere abstraction.
94 U.S. 288, 288 (1877).
'0' 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854).
102 Id. at 339.
103

id.

Id. at 340.
'os Id. at 342. It is still true today that the substitution of equivalent elements does not
avoid infringement of a patent claim, a rule known as the "doctrine of equivalents." See
Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
06
' LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 175.
1o Winans, 56 U.S. at 342.
0
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word "principle" invites confusion. 08 In Le Roy, it meant a principle in the
abstract-a"fundamental truth," as opposed to a practical design.' 09 In Winans,
"principle" meant the thing that makes the invention work-the way that the
invention tums a "fundamental truth" to practical advantage.
Winans, nevertheless, shows the difficulty of striking the right balance. A
patent that omits too much detail embraces a principle in the abstract; yet the
details specified in some patents must be ignored in favor of the "principle" at
stake. The invention that can be the subject of a patent, and the invention that must
be avoided by a potential infringer, lies in some middle ground of generality, with
certain limits observed and others ignored. The claims are not a reliable guide to
identifying that invention. Morse's invention was narrower than his Claim 8,
which omitted all details except the use of electromagnetism to transmit messages.
Winans' invention was broader than his claims, which specified the frustum of a
cone. As the Court wrote in Tilghman, "[w]hoever discovers that a certain useful
result will be produced in any art by the use of certain means is entitled to a patent
for it, provided he specifies the 'means.' But everything turns on the force and
meaning of the word 'means."'llo Morse characterized his "means" too
ambitiously-Winans too modestly.
Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co,"' concerning an improved
automatic air brake for trains, illustrates the tension. To facilitate rapid braking in
an emergency, the improved design allowed compressed air to flow directly from
the main reservoir to the brake cylinder without passing through an auxiliary
reservoir.1 2 The defendants accomplished the same thing through a mechanically
different arrangement. The patent claimed the invention in general terms, including
references to what the components of the apparatus would do."l 3 This the Court
viewed as "a claim . . . to a certain extent, for a function,""14 leading the Court to
review the cases distinguishing between unpatentable principles and patentable
"means." Ultimately, the Court found that Westinghouse must be limited to its

108
09

'

55 U.S. at 174.
Id. at 175.

110 Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1881).
"' 170 U.S. 537 (1898).
112 Id. at 538.
" The second claim of the patent read:

[I]n a brake mechanism, the combination of a main air-pipe, an auxiliary
reservoir, a brake-cylinder and a triple-valve having a piston, whose preliminary
traverse admits air from the auxiliary reservoir to the brake-cylinder, and which
by a further traverse admits air directly from the main air-pipe to the brakecylinder, substantially as set forth.
Id. at 553.
114 Id. at 554.
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own mechanism.' 15 Justice Shiras, writing in dissent, relied on Winans for the
proposition that a patent should extend to other mechanisms that operate by the
same principle.1 6 His summary of Tilghman, which Shiras thought "[v]ery
applicable to the present case," is that "a patent may be validly granted for carrying
a principle into effect,"' 17 and the patentee may claim a "mode" of operation, if no
particular apparatus is necessary to "obtain benefit from the principle.""" Shiras, in
short, took a more general view of Westinghouse's invention than did the majority,
regarding as "means" what the majority held to be "principle."" 9
D. Rubber-Tip Pencil
Before we leave the nineteenth century, one more case is worth considering:
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard.120 The patentee claimed a simple invention-a
rubber eraser with a hole in it so that the eraser could be affixed to the end of a
pencil. The eraser could be of almost any shape, as could the hole, so long as it was
slightly smaller in width than the diameter of the pencil.121 Rubber erasers were
already known, as was the natural elasticity of rubber and its ability to grip objects
in the manner described. "What," asked the Court, "is left for this patentee but the
idea that if a pencil is inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber smaller than itself
the rubber will attach itself to the pencil, and when so attached become convenient
for use as an eraser?" 22 The Court concluded, "[a]n idea of itself is not patentable,
but a new device by which it may be made practically useful is. The idea of this
patentee was a good one, but his device to give it effect, though useful, was not
new. Consequently he took nothing by his patent."l 2 3
Rubber-Tip Pencil is difficult to categorize. It resembles Le Roy in two
respects: its reference to the natural elastic properties of rubber, and its concession
that one may patent the means by which "ideas" are "made practically useful." But
the "idea" in this case is not some principle of nature in the abstract; it is a plan for
an eraser conveniently attached to the end of a pencil. The inventor had not only
this "idea," but a "device" for making it useful.
The case raises many questions. Why is affixing a rubber eraser to the end of
a pencil an unpatentable "idea," compared to any other "idea" for an invention?
What did the Court mean by the "device to give it effect?" How does this "device,"

." Id. at 572-73.
"1Id. at 575-76 (Shiras, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 578-79.
11 id.
"' Westinghouse, Justice Shiras concluded, was a "pioneer inventor ... entitled to

protection against those who, availing themselves of [his] discovery, seek to justify
themselves by pointing to mere differences in form . . . ."Id. at 581.
120 87 U.S. 498 (1874).
121 Id. at 506-07.
122 Id. at 507.
123 id
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as a concept, differ from the "idea" that could not be patented? Does any of this
matter if the case is really about novelty? The legacy of Rubber-Tip Pencil is
primarily this: it includes the convenient phrase "[a]n idea of itself is not
patentable," a phrase that enjoyed a rich after-life, as we will see, in the twentieth
century. Although the subsequent cases bore little factual resemblance to the
original, and the ambiguities of the reasoning were never resolved, the phrase has
been quoted, repeatedly, as authority to disallow patents to "abstract ideas" in

many guises.14
To summarize, the benchmark cases of the nineteenth century hold that one
cannot patent principles of nature or natural phenomena in the abstract. A patent of
such breadth would only hinder technological progress. One can, however, patent
the means discovered for putting nature to work. The usual point of contention is
the generality with which one can claim the means, and the extent to which one
can describe the means in terms of underlying principles.

IV.

"ABSTRACT IDEAS" IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
ADAPTING TO THE INFORMATION AGE

The Supreme Court would revisit these themes in the twentieth century, when
the inventions debated often involved, in place of natural phenomena like
electromagnetism or the properties of lead, the less tangible components of
information age technology. Now the principle at work might be a principle of
mathematics rather than chemistry or physics. 125 Yet the Supreme Court would
continue to cite cases like Morse and Le Roy for the ground rules of patentable
subject matter, reinforcing the fundamental divide between unpatentable principles
and patentable means. By the end of the century, enthusiastic application of the
principle/means approach would push the lower courts to endorse the patentability
of any invention capable of producing a "useful, concrete and tangible result" 126 even inventions that manipulate data, account balances, symbols, or other
intangibles. The courts still maintained that abstract ideas are not patentable, but it
would become increasingly uncertain what that meant.
The following sections explore several analytical frameworks the Court has
employed in confronting inventions that are, in some respects, inherently abstract.
Section A discusses the Supreme Court's response to patents on computer software
and mathematical algorithms. Section B examines the confusing history of the
mental steps doctrine. Section C looks patents claiming methods of analysis.
Finally, Section D reviews the expansion of patentable subject matter to embrace
methods of doing business and other intangible pursuits of the information age.

See infra notes 134, 156, 205 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (analyzing patentability of
mathematical algorithm); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (addressing invention
of method for converting binary-coded-decimal numerals into pure binary numbers).
126 See infra note 238 and accompanying
text.
124
125
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A. MathematicalAlgorithms
In Gottschalk v. Benson,1 2 7 the applicant claimed a mathematical procedure,
or "algorithm," for converting numbers represented in binary-coded decimal
(BCD) form into pure binary form. The claims were not confined "to any particular
art or technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end
use," although the method was intended for use in a computer.12 8 Addressing
whether the algorithm qualified as a patentable process, the Court cited Morse for
its warning that a claim without limits would impede the "onward march of
science." 2 9 The Court found Benson's claim unacceptably broad:
Here the "process" claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover
both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion.
The end use may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of
drivers' licenses to researching the law books for precedents and (2) be
performed through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery
or without any apparatus.' 30
The Court found that Benson's patent would preempt any practical use of his
algorithm, so that "in practical effect," Benson's patent would be one for an
"idea."'' "It is conceded," the Court remarked, "that one may not patent an

idea."l 32
The Court's discussion of the law begins with an uncontroversial proposition,
stated in Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. ofAmerica,13 3 a case concerning
an antenna optimized by the use of scientific principles: "While a scientific truth,
or the mathematical expressionof it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be."1 34
This statement, the Court writes, "followed" the venerable rule of Rubber-Tip
Pencil that "an idea of itself is not patentable."' 3 5 Next the Court quotes from Le
Roy the passage holding that "[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth;

12'409 U.S. 63 (1972).
121 Id at 64.
129 Id. at 68 (quoting O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854)) (intemal
quotation marks omitted).
3o Id.
'' Id. at 71-72.
132 Id. at 71.
'3 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
134 Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (quoting Mackay, 306 U.S. at 94) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
3 Id. (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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an original cause; a motive" and cannot, therefore, be patented. 3 6 So far, one could
conclude, in spite of the general reference to "ideas," that the Court is merely
rehearsing the distinction between principles of nature and practical applications.
Then the Court writes without quotation: "Phenomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable,
as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work."l 3 7 The paragraph
concludes with another reference to the distinction between natural phenomena and
their practical application.138
With the possible exception of the cryptic phrase from Rubber-Tip Pencil, the
authorities cited here, and throughout the Benson opinion, deal with principles or
phenomena of nature. They do not refer, at least in the same terminology, to
"abstract intellectual concepts." It is important to ask, therefore, whether Benson
adds something new to the domain of unpatentable subject matter, or whether
"abstract intellectual concepts" simply refers to principles of nature-a category
that might be stretched to include mathematical relationships of the kind exploited
by the algorithm in question. Unfortunately, it is not clear what the Court means.
Later the Court attacks Benson's claim as "abstract and sweeping," referring to the
breadth of the claim and its potential to preempt the work of other researchers.' 39
The scope of the claim, and its impact on the progress of the technological arts, is
what ultimately condemns it. Although Benson might have regarded the wideranging utility of his invention as a point in his favor,14 0 this very quality seems to
be the measure of an "abstract intellectual concept."
The Court did not conclude that all innovations in computer software must be
dismissed as unpatentable ideas. Benson calls the "[t]ransformation and reduction
of an article to a different state or thing" the "clue to the patentability" of any
process not limited to particular machines.141 Software only manipulates symbols
and data; it does not produce any physical transformation. But the Court did not
say, explicitly, that only processes limited to particular machines, or that transform
articles into a different thing, qualify as patentable subject matter.142 Perhaps limits

Id. (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
I37 Id.
136

138

Id.

139

Id. at 68.

A sign of "the beauty and simplicity, and comprehensiveness of the invention," to
borrow a phrase from the Le Roy dissent. 55 U.S. at 186 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
140
141

409 U.S. 63,'70 (1972) (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877))

(internal quotation marks omitted).
142 The Court cautioned:
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine

or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a "different state
or thing." We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not
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could be imposed in other ways that would prevent an algorithm claim from being
"abstract and sweeping" in the manner of Benson's claim.
In the subsequent case of Parker v. Flook,143 the invention concerned the
catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons.14 4 During the conversion process, measured
temperatures, pressures, and other factors were not to exceed predetermined "alarm
limits." Flook's "invention" was the use of a mathematical algorithm to
continuously update the alarm limits.145 Flook's claim was not as "abstract and
sweeping" as Benson's because it did not extend to any field in which the
algorithm might be applied.146 Nevertheless, the Court held that Flook did not
claim a patentable "process." When the Court discounted the mathematical
algorithm, treating it as though it were part of the prior art, the remainder of
Flook's application contained no patentable invention.14 7
Flook rejected the algorithm because laws of nature cannot be patented, and
Benson had reasoned that "an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of
nature."l 48 That is one interpretation of Benson, though it misses the element of
breadth and preclusion that Benson stressed, and that is far less evident in Flook.
To justify the unpatentability of natural laws, Flook invokes "[t]he underlying
notion . . . that a scientific principle, such as that expressed in respondent's
algorithm, reveals a relationship that has always existed."' 49 Patentable subject
matter must be new, "not merely heretofore unknown.", 50 The reason for the
exclusion is that "the public must not be deprived of any rights that it theretofore
freely enjoyed."' 5 '
Flook repeats the list of unpatentable subject matter offered in Benson"[p]henomena of nature .

.

. mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts,"

again referring to these as "the basic tools of scientific and technological work." 5 2
Flook does not clearly state whether a mathematical algorithm is a phenomenon of
nature, an abstract intellectual concept, or something else entirely. It does not
define "abstract intellectual concepts," nor does it explain whether such concepts
are necessarily ones that, like natural relationships, "already existed." Although
Flook cites the historic cases that distinguished between natural principles and
practical applications, it criticizes the applicant for "assum[ing] that if a process
meet the requirements of our prior precedents. It is said that the decision
precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold.
Id. at 71.
' 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
144 Id. at 586.
145
146

Id. at 585.

Id. at 586.

147 Id. at 594.
148 Id. at 589.
149 Id.at 593 n.15.
50
1 Id.

(quoting PETER D. ROSENBERG,

PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS

'5'

Id (internal quotation marks omitted).

1s2

Id at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted).

13 (1975)).
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application implements a principle in some specific fashion, it automatically falls
within the patentable subject matter of §101."'"' This approach, the Court
explained, "would make the determination of patentable subject matter depend
underlying the
simply on the draftsman's artl 54 and would ill serve the principles
5
1
prohibition against patents for 'ideas' or phenomena of nature."'
The final chapter in the Court's mathematical algorithm trilogy is Diamondv.
Diehr.156 Here the invention was a process of molding synthetic rubber.
Instruments continuously monitored the temperature inside the press, and when a

computer, employing the well-known Arrhenius equation, calculated that the time
had arrived, it signaled a device to open the mold.'5 7 The facts resemble those in
Flook; both involve instruments monitoring an industrial process and a computer
constantly recalculating a useful figure. In Flook the figure is the updated alarm
limit, in Diehr the right time to open the press. But in Diehr the Court held the
claims patentable subject matter because, as a whole, they described an industrial
process that transformed liquid rubber into manufactured articles. That one part of
the process involved a mathematical algorithm did not disqualify it.' 58 The Court
distinguished Flook by observing that an alarm limit is "simply a number," and
that Flook's application had not discussed any of the physical process steps
involved in the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons; "[a]ll that [Flook] provides is
a formula for computing an updated alarm limit."' 59
Diehr identifies as unpatentable discoveries "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas." 6 0 The list has evolved somewhat since Flook,
adding "laws of nature" to "natural phenomena," omitting "mental processes," and
substituting "abstract ideas" for "abstract intellectual concepts." Diehr adds little to
our understanding of abstract ideas, though it is clear that an industrial process
taking advantage of a mathematical formula is not abstract. The authorities Diehr
cites are the familiar ones, including the remark from Le Roy that "[a] principle in
the abstract, is a fundamental truth . . . [in which] no one can claim . . . an

as well as the phrase from Rubber-Tip Pencil warning that
exclusive right,"
"[a]n idea of itself is not patentable." 6 2 As in Flook, the Court treats a

' Id at 593.
Meaning, apparently, that one could artificially constrict the reach of one's claims
without adding anything genuinely inventive-without, in other words, really going
beyond the natural principle itself. An example might be claiming all uses of the laws of
gravity in the field of hydroelectric power.
15 Flook, 437 U.S. at 593.
156 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
154

1
118

Id. at 177-79.

Id. at
Id. at
160 Id at
161 Id at
59

62

1

184-85.
186-87.
185.
185 (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853)).

Id (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 489, 507 (1874)).
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mathematical algorithm, separated from a practical application "like a law of
nature, which cannot be the subject of a patent."l 6 3
Benson, Flook, and Diehr firmly established that "abstract ideas" are not
patentable subject matter, but they did little to clarify the prohibition. Are abstract
ideas limited to principles of nature or mathematics? Are they limited to truths or
relationships that "already existed"? Or do they include any broadly-conceived
idea that, claimed as such, would preempt a vast area of technological inquiry, or
deny researchers their "basic tools"?
B. Mental Processes
Another category of unpatentable subject matter is what Benson calls "mental
processes"-the type of invention once subject to the "mental steps doctrine."
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Diehr, calls the mental steps doctrine a product of the
"familiar principle that a scientific concept or mere idea cannot be the subject of a
valid patent."' 64 Mental processes, then, might be a species of abstract idea, or they
might have something in common with abstract ideas that disqualifies them both as
patentable subject matter.
The history of the mental steps doctrine is a confusing one, described shortly
before Benson as "something of a morass." 6 5 In the 1940s, inventions depending
on new ways to exercise human judgment had been held to lie beyond the limits of
patentable subject matter. An example is In re Heritage,166 where the applicant
claimed a method of selecting the optimal amount of coating for sound-absorbing
boards by subjecting samples, with differing thicknesses applied, to acoustic
tests.167 The feature said to be novel was the selection itself, based on criteria set
out in the applicant's system. "Such purely mental acts," held the Court, "are not
proper subject matter for protection under the patent statutes.", 6 8 Similarly,
methods of observing and calculating had been held unpatentable. In Halliburton
Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,' 69 the Ninth Circuit addressed a method of
using echoes to locate an obstruction in a well.170 The "mental steps" detailedincluding steps of "observing," "measuring," "counting," and "computing"-were
not patentable subject matter, even if novel.' 7' The Court referred to the Cochrane
definition of "process" as "an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject

163

Id. at 186.

Id. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165 In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 890 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
166 150 F.2d 554 (C.C.P.A.
1945).
167 Id. at 556.
164

168

169

1o

''

Id.

146 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1944).

Id. at 818.

Id. at 821 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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72
That
matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing."'
the
patentable,
were
methods
such
If
process.
a
thought
transformation is absent in
would
than
broader
Court observed, "the patentee would have a monopoly much
the patentee of a particular apparatus." 73
The story becomes more complicated when the claimed method is an
otherwise patentable process that includes one or more mental steps. In In re
Abrams,'74 the applicant claimed a method of prospecting for petroleum deposits
by measuring the outflow of gasses from exploratory drill sites.175 The method
included some physical steps (e.g., sealing boreholes and reducing their pressure)
and some mental steps (e.g., comparing the outflow of different boreholes to detect
anomalies).1 76 The applicant suggested certain "rules of law" for dealing with
hybrid claims. If the method was "purely mental in character," it would be
unpatentable. If the method combined mental steps with physical steps, then
patentability would depend on the source of the novelty. Where the physical steps
were novel, and the mental steps "incidental parts of the process," the method
could be patented. Where the innovation lay entirely in the mental steps, the
method would be disqualified.17 7 Although these suggestions "appear[ed] to
accord" with precedent,' 78 the court found that Abrams' invention actually fell in
the latter category, disqualifying his invention as patentable subject matter.' 79
In 1951, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) held it
"thoroughly established" that mental processes do not constitute patentable subject
matter. 80 The Abrams court hardly bothered to justify that conclusion: "It is selfevident," the court proclaimed, "that thought is not patentable."' 8 ' But things
began to unravel in the late 1960s.
In the first Prateropinion,' 8 2 Judge Smith of the CCPA questioned the origins
of the mental steps doctrine. Cochrane, he found, should not be read to limit
process claims to those that physically transform matter. The often-quoted
passage 83 had been "misconstrued as a 'rule' or 'definition"' excluding processes
without a physical dimension; in fact, the intention had been merely "to point out

172

Id. (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
173id
174

188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 195 1).

' Id. at 165.

176 id.

'7Id. at 166.
' 7 Id. at 167.
1
80

Id at 170.
ln re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951).

"8 188 F.2d at 168.
182
183

In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968).

Coming, 56 U.S. at 254 ("A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to

produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to
be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.").
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that a process is not limited to the means used in performing it."1 8 4 In the
Telephone Cases, the Supreme Court had approved method claims "involving
processes acting on energy rather than physical matter,"' 85 and in Tilghman the
court had "focuse[d] attention on the mental aspect of process inventions."l86
Cases rejecting thought processes had really turned on an absence of novelty.'8 7
Finally, the rules discussed in Abrams, according to Judge Smith, had been
adopted by that court merely for purposes of argument-to demonstrate that the
applicant could not win, even on his own terms. 88
Having cast doubt on the mental steps doctrine in its entirety, Judge Smith
concluded that any process that could be performed by a machine or in the human
mind should qualify as patentable subject matter, so long as it was "directed to an
industrial technology-a 'useful art' within the intendment of the Constitution." 8 9
Here the patent claimed a method of spectrographic analysis that could be
performed by an analog or digital computer, making it a patentable process.190
The following year, the second Prateropinion' 9 ' superseded the first. On this
occasion, the court held the claims indefinite for failing to limit the invention to
machine implementation, as the applicant had intended.19 2 The court's discussion
of mental processes, much of it reproduced from the first Prateropinion, could be
dismissed as dicta. However, the court once again distinguished cases in which a
claimed method consisted of "purely mental steps" that could only be performed in
the human mind.'9 3 Whether such methods qualify as a process under the 1952
Patent Act was, the court concluded, "an issue which has never been squarely
decided." 9 4 Nevertheless, because the applicant had invented a process that could
be performed by machines, the court found it unnecessary to address the issue.1 9 5
The next development came with In re Musgrave,' 96 a 1970 case concerning a
method of analyzing seismograms. Here the court firmly rejected the Abrams rules,

184

Id. at 1388.

'8 5 id.
18 6 id.

Judge Smith traced the mental steps doctrine to Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d
58 (9th Cir. 1932). Don Lee held that a method of computing the best distribution of
counterweights in a V-8 engine was not statutory subject matter. In re Prater,415 F.2d at
1387. That conclusion is expressed in a statement which, said Judge Smith, "is not only
unsupported by any citation of precedent but in its inception was directed to subject matter
that was not even novel." Id.
188 In re Prater,415 F.2d at 1386.
19 Id. at 1389.
187

190 Id
'91 415

F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).

Id. at 1404.
193 Id. at 1402.
192

194 Id. at
195
196

id.

1402 n.23.

431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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finding it "logically unsound" to consider a method with both physical and mental
steps a patentable process only if the physical steps are novel.1 97 As to processes
without any physical steps, the court conceded that certain "peculiarly human"
activities, impossible for machines, might constitute unpatentable subject matter.
These would include methods requiring "human 'value judgments' in matters
such as politics, morals, or aesthetics.198 On the other hand, no machine-ready
process should be rejected as unpatentable subject matter merely because the
process could be could be carried out by a thoughtful human being. "All that is
necessary," held the court, "to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory
'process' . . . is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with

the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of the 'useful arts."" 99 Judge
Baldwin, who dissented, characterized the latter statement as "throw[ing] out
entirely the 'mental steps' doctrine and replac[ing] it with a new rule." 200
Although Musgrave is the case identified by Justice Stevens as "effectively
dispos[ing] of any vestiges of the mental steps doctrine," 20 1 the obituary was
premature. As computers displaced human operators in countless areas of
technology, debates concerning machine-implemented mathematical algorithms
took center stage. Yet the categories of unpatentable subject matter listed in
Benson and Flook still include mental processes.2 02 The Federal Circuit, successor
203
to the CCPA, would ultimately reaffirm the unpatentability of thought processes.
Although the reasoning is difficult to follow, it suggests, as discussed in Part
VI.A., that if mental processes and "abstract ideas" are not the same thing, at least
they have elements in common.204
C. Methods ofAnalysis

Methods of analyzing data have often tested the limits of abstractness. Shortly
after Diehr, the CCPA decided In re Meyer,205 a case involving a computerimplemented method of testing a complex system and analyzing the results to

' Id. at 889 ("[A] given process including both 'physical' and 'mental' steps could
be statutory during the infancy of the field of technology to which it pertained, when the
physical steps were new, and non-statutory at some later time after the physical steps
became old, acquiring prior art status, which would be an absurd result.").
198 Id. at 889 n.4 (quoting Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 417, 426 (1952)).
99 Idat 893.
Id. at 894 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).

200
201
202

(1978).

203
204
205

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 200 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589
See infra notes 308-313 and accompanying text.
See infra,notes 306-320 and accompanying text.

688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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locate a malfunction. 20 6 The applicants envisioned the use of their system to aid a
neurologist in rendering a diagnosis. 20 The claims, however, were not limited to
any particular field; they referred generally to "factors" associated with the
"elements" of a system, which were "modified" (in an unspecified fashion)
according to the response of those "elements" to a sequence of tests.208 Because of
the lack of specifics, and the potential to apply the method in any number of fields,
one might have expected the court to dismiss the claim as an abstract idea. Instead,
the court treated the claim as one embracing a "mathematical algorithm," in spite
of the absence from the claim of any specific formula or mathematical

procedure. 2 09
The court called the exclusion of mathematical algorithms "consistent with
the [Supreme] Court's long-standing exclusion from patentable subject matter of
scientific principles, laws of nature, ideas and mental processes."2 10 Some
mathematical algorithms represent laws of nature, which cannot be patented
because those laws "have existed throughout time, define the relationship of man
to his environment, and, as a consequence, ought not to be the subject of exclusive
rights of any one person."21 1 Other mathematical algorithms do not embody
principles of nature, but rather "ideas or mental processes"; they are, in other
words, "simply logical vehicles for communicating possible solutions to complex
problems."2 12 To explain why these are unpatentable, the court cites none of the
cases involving the mental steps doctrine. The most pertinent authority the court

206 Id. at 790.
207 See id. at 793. The court observed:

The Solicitor characterized the invention, without objection, as a
'diagnostic' or 'memory' aid for a physician and emphasized that the invention
does not conduct a diagnosis in and of itself, but is used by a doctor when
performing a diagnosis to store and to accumulate test responses obtained by this
standard process of elimination and to narrow the neurological area of possible
malfunction.
Id.

208

See id. at 792-93.

Id. at 796. The examiner, who came to the same conclusion, quoted the following
language from In re Richman: "That a claim includes a mathematical expression is not
determinative. The decisive factor is whether a claimed method is essentially a
mathematical calculation." Id. at 793 (quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030
(C.C.P.A. 1977)). Replacing mathematical notation with "words which mean the same
thing" does not affect whether the claim describes statutory subject matter. Id. (citation
omitted)
2 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 794.
211 Id. at 795 (citing LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 155, 175 (1853)).
212 Id. at 794-95.
209
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does provide is the familiar phrase from Rubber-Tip Pencil-"[a]nidea of itself is
not patentable."2 13
The court identified the mathematical algorithm implicit in Meyer's claims as
an algorithm representing "a mental process that a neurologist should follow," 214
even though Meyer's intention was actually to replace a human thought process
with a machine-implemented logic and "memory aid." 2 15 Nevertheless, the court
did not find that the presence of the algorithm necessarily condemned the claim;
the question was whether the patent claimed the algorithm itself, or a specific
application of the algorithm to modify an otherwise statutory process.216 In short,
was Meyer's invention more like Benson's or more like Diehr's? The court
concluded that the claims described nothing more than "a mathematical algorithm
representing a mental process," and rejected the patent application on that basis. 2 17
In the subsequent case In re Grams,2 18 the Federal Circuit addressed a similar
patent application. The invention was a method of testing a complex system with a
number of components and identifying the components responsible for an
abnormality. 2 1 9 As in Meyer, the claims specified very little about the nature of the
system or the tests to be conducted. The method could be used to assist in patient
diagnosis, or it could be applied to any other electrical, chemical, mechanical, or
biological system. 2 2 0 The result was the same, but this time the court did not rely
on characterizing the claimed invention as a "thought process" or an "idea."
Instead, the court simply identified the invention as a mathematical algorithm,
which in Benson had joined the list of unpatentable "processes." 22 1 Where physical
steps are also involved, a process claim incorporating a mathematical algorithm
may be patentable. 2 2 2 But the only physical step in this case involved gathering
data, and so little was disclosed about that step that, "in essence," the invention
was nothing more than the algorithm itself.223
The Arrhythmia case2 24 of 1992 provides a useful contrast. The patentee
claimed a method of analyzing cardiographic signals in order to identify patients at
risk of ventricular tachycardia. 2 2 5 The Federal Circuit reversed the finding of the

Id. at 795 (alteration in original) (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874)).
214 id
215 See id. at 793 (internal quotation marks omitted).
213

216

217
218

2 19
220

221

See id. at 795-96.
Id. at 796.

888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 836.
id.
See id. at 837.

222 Id.
223
224

1992).
225

at 838 (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).

Id. at 840.

Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Carazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir.

See id at 1054-55.

THE PARADOX OF "ABSTRACT IDEAS"

2011

823

district court that the invention embraced an unpatentable mathematical algorithm.
A mathematical formula, the court explained, "may describe a law of nature, a
scientific truth, or an abstract idea." 2 26 Alternatively, "mathematics may also be
used to describe steps of a statutory method or elements of a statutory
apparatus."227 As the court read Diehr, it is the "abstract" rather than "sweeping"
nature of claim incorporating a mathematical algorithm that may cause it to be
condemned as unpatentable subject matter.228 In this case the claimed invention
was neither abstract nor sweeping. The mathematical formulas were part of a
procedure to transform, through filtering and otherwise, an electrical signal
obtained by monitoring a patient's heart. 22 9 The product of that transformation was
"not an abstract number, but . . . a signal related to the patient's heart activity."230
Unlike the claims in Morse or Benson, these did not preempt the use of the
formulas in other applications yet to be discovered.23 ' Certainly the claims at issue
in Arrhythmia were very different from those rejected in Meyer and Grams. Where
those claims described analytical procedures in the most vague and general terms,
these detailed a specific application of mathematics to obtain useful informationa distinction that recalls the principle/application dichotomy.
D. Business Methods and Other Intangibles
In the 1990s, the fault lines of patentable subject matter moved sharply in the
direction of utility, a transition foreshadowed in Arrhythmia.2 32 A principle might
be unpatentable, but a practical application of a principle was another matter, even
if the application did not involve physical things or fields of endeavor generally
233
regarded as technological. An important step in this evolution was In re Alappat,
an en banc 1994 Federal Circuit decision.
Alappat concerned an improved digital oscilloscope display. A display
composed of pixels arranged in rows and columns is prone to "aliasing"-the
appearance of jagged shapes and other imperfections when depicting anything
other than vertical or horizontal lines. Alappat invented a method of smoothing the
appearance of lines on an oscilloscope display by illuminating certain pixels with

26
227

228

Id. at 1056.
id.

Id. at 1057.

Id. at 1059 ("These claimed steps of 'converting,' 'applying,' 'determining,' and
'comparing' are physical process steps that transform one physical, electrical signal into
another.").
230 Id.
229

21id.
232 See

id. at 1061 (apparatus claims met the criteria for statutory subject matter
because "[t]hey [were] directed to a specific apparatus of practical utility and specified
application").
233 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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reduced intensity.234 A computer employing a mathematical formula determined
the intensity for each pixel. 235 Alappat's claim 15 described an apparatus
consisting of means for calculating and outputting the necessary data.236 The
Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the Patent Office and held that Alappat's
invention was patentable subject matter.
Although the Supreme Court had held mathematical algorithms unpatentable,
close examination of the decisions in Benson, Flook and Diehr showed that the
court had not intended to create a new category of unpatentable subject matter
distinct from "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."237 In each
case, the Supreme Court had tried to "explain a rather straightforward concept,
namely, that certain types of mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent
nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical
application . . . ."238 Abstract ideas are "disembodied concepts" that are not "useful
until reduced to some practical application." 23 9 Alappat had claimed something
useful-a better-looking oscilloscope display. His invention was not a
disembodied concept; his invention was a "specific machine to produce a useful,
concrete, and tangible result."24 0
A claim that fell short of specifying the useful application of a mathematical
process could still be dismissed as an abstract idea. In re Warmerdam,24 ' decided
shortly after Alappat, concerned a mathematical construct known as a "bubble
hierarchy," best visualized in connection with its most likely application-helping
robots avoid collisions.2 42 If the path of a robot intersects an imaginary bubble
generally surrounding the location of an object, a computer evaluates the chance of
a collision by looking next at a set of smaller bubbles more closely matching the
actual shape of the object.243 If the analysis still shows a possible collision, the
process continues until the system discounts the occurrence of a collision or takes
action to avoid it. 24 4 Warmerdam's invention involved positioning the bubbles

234
235
23 6

Id. at 1537.

Id. at 1538.

Id. at
Id. at
238 Id. at
239 Id. at
237

1538-39.
1542-43.
1543.
1542 n. 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 1544; see also Richard S. Gruner, In Search of the Undiscovered Country:
The Challenge of Describing Patentable Subject Matter, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH, L.J. 395, 412 (2007) (describing the Alappat standard as a "negative test" to
240

identify advancements that are not "abstract ideas" under Benson).
241 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
Id. at 1355.
id
244 See id. at 1355-56.
242
243
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along the medial axis of the object in question.245 The court rejected his method
246
claims as unpatentable subject matter.
Warmerdam's claims, which included steps of "locating" the medial axis of
an object and "creating" a bubble hierarchy, "describe[d] nothing more than the
manipulation of basic mathematical constructs, the paradigmatic 'abstract
idea."' 2 47 Citing Rubber-Tip Pencil, and its admonition that "[a]n idea of itself is
not patentable," the court concluded that "taking several abstract ideas and
manipulating them together adds nothing to the basic equation." 24 8 The court found
Warmerdam's argument that the manipulation of data provided enough "physical"
activity to make the claims patentable unconvincing.24 9
It is true, particularly with ideas expressed in mathematical form, that if a
claim requires more than the manipulation of ideas so that the process
described in the claim produces something quite different, then the
process might indeed describe statutory subject matter. The problem with
Warmerdam's argument is that the claims here do not have that effect. It
is the claims which define the metes and bounds of the invention entitled
250
to the protection of the patent system.
If the claims had specified that the bubble data represented the possible
location of an object with which a robot could collide, and that the output
information was to be used by a robot in avoiding a collision, then consistency
with Arrhythmia suggests that the claim would have been patentable subject
25
matter.251
Warmerdam's invention had a practical application in the world of solid,
tangible things, where one robot scrapes by another as they traverse a crowded
factory floor.252 Perhaps Warmerdam's error was in failing to claim his invention
in those concrete terms and limit his claims to that real-world application.
Other kinds of inventions are inherently more abstract, regardless of the how
they are claimed. In re Schrader2 5 3 concerned a method of conducting an auction

245

Id at 1356.

246 Id at 1362.
247 Id at 1360.
248 Id

Id.
id
251 Indeed, the court did find Warmerdam's "machine" claim, which
described
nothing other than a computer executing the claimed method, to be patentable subject
matter. Claim 5, in the words of the court, "covers any machine (presumably including a
known computer) having a memory which contains any data representing a bubble
hierarchy determined by any of the methods of claims 1-4." Id. at 1361. Although it
appears in substance to be the same invention, the court simply says "[c]laim 5 is for a
machine, and is clearly patentable subject matter." Id. at 1360.
249
250

252 Id. at 1355.
253

22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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designed to extract the best price for the seller where a number of related items,
like contiguous tracts of land, are offered for sale.254 The auctioned items might
have been tangible, but the method involved only intangibles-offering items for
sale, receiving bids, recording bids, identifying the optimum combination of bids,
and so forth.25 5 In Arrhythmia, the claimed method had manipulated information
related to the activity of a patient's heart; it had a connection, in other words, to the
world of physical things. Here the information related to non-physical things, like
the willingness of buyer and seller to exchange symbols in a bank account for
documents representing ownership of land.256 The manipulation of intangibles, the
court held, does not constitute a patentable process unless those intangibles
represent "physical activity or objects." 2 57 Judge Newman dissented, arguing that
Schrader's method "involve[dj more than mental steps or theories or plans," and
that it did not constitute "a scientific principle, law of nature, natural phenomenon,
or abstract idea." 2 58 Even if the mathematics involved was an abstract idea,
Schrader had applied it in "a technological process to produce a useful result." 2 59
Judge Newman wrote that "the patent system is directed to tangible things and
procedures, not mere ideas,"2 60 yet her use of the word "tangible" seems to refer
not to things that are physical, but to things that are useful in a specific application.
Judge Newman's view prevailed in the controversial State Street Bank and
Trust v. Signature FinancialGroup decision. 2 6 1 The patent in State Street claimed
a system for managing a family of mutual funds. The funds shared certain
resources through a commonly owned investment portfolio organized as a
partnership. This "Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration" combined
economies of scale with tax advantages. 26 2 The patent claimed the "data processing
system" for carrying out the necessary calculations-a machine.263 Yet the claims
defined the machine solely in terms of the functions it would perform, and the
court observed that the exceptions to patentable subject matter, including the
exception for abstract ideas, could be applied to machine claims as well as process
claims.264 Combining the authority of Diehr with its own language from Alappat,
the court held that "certain types of mathematical subject matter . . . represent

254

See id. at 291.
See id at 291-92. Because "there is nothing physical about bids per se," even acts
like "the grouping or regrouping of bids" does not produce "a physical change, effect, or
result." Id. at 293-94.
256 See id. at 293-94.
27 Id. at 294. Bell's method of transmitting speech by electrical signal was patentable
because the signal represented the physical activity of speaking. See id. at 295 n.12.
255

258 Id.

259

at 296 (Newman, J., dissenting).

Id at 297.

260 Id.

at 298.
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
262 See id. at 1370.
263 id
264 Id. at 1372 n.1.
261
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nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical
application, i.e., 'a useful, concrete and tangible result."' 2 65 Although "concrete"
and "tangible" suggest something physical, the court adopted Judge Newman's
view that utility is the key: "[u]npatentable mathematical algorithms are
identifiable by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied
concepts or truths that are not 'useful.' From a practical standpoint, this means that
to be patentable an algorithm must be applied in a 'useful' way."266 The invention
here was not an abstract idea because managing a family of mutual funds is a
practical application of mathematics-a "useful, concrete and tangible result." 267
Underscoring the irrelevance of physicality in defining what is abstract, the court
also took the "opportunity to lay .

.

. to rest" the traditional view that methods of

doing business are not patentable.268 In the end, whether a claim describes
patentable subject matter does not depend on whether the invention "does
'business' instead of something else."2 69
The AT&T v. Excel Communications2 70 case in 1999 further emphasized that
utility is the opposite pole of abstractness. The invention in this case was a
message record for long-distance telephone calls that includes a flag to indicate
which long-distance service had been used by the local carrier. 2 7 1 The record
keeping involved basic aspects of Boolean algebra.272 Although mathematics in the

266

Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
id.

267

Id.

265

Id. at 1375. Judge Newman called for the abolition of the business methods
exception in her Schrader dissent. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, at 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (calling the business methods exception a "fuzzy" concept and
"unwarranted encumbrance," best dismissed as "error-prone, redundant, and obsolete").
Judge Newman concluded that the traditional cases recognizing the exception "simply
reaffirm that the patent system is directed to tangible things and procedures, not mere
ideas." Id. As in the State Street opinion, her use of "tangible" is striking, clearly not
referring to physical things that one could touch, but something (like a method of
maximizing the prices realized in an auction) that is useful in a specific way.
269 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377. Interestingly, in light of Morse, Benson, and other
cases that treat the preemptive effect of the claim as the mark of an abstract idea, the court
in State Street held that the breadth of the claim had no bearing on whether it was directed
to patentable subject matter. Id. The lower court had observed that the challenged claims
268

were broad enough to "foreclosevirtually any computer-implemented accounting method
necessary to manage this type offinancial structure." Id. The foreclosure would not have

been as dramatic as that described in Benson or Morse, yet, surprisingly, the State Street
court dismissed the foreclosure as having "nothing to do with whether what is claimed is
statutory subject matter." Id.
270 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
271 Id. at 1353.
272

See id. at 1353-55, 1358.
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abstract could be unpatentable subject matter,273 here the invention was not "a
disembodied mathematical concept." 27 4 AT&T claimed Boolean processes only to
obtain the "useful, non-abstract result" of recording carrier information relevant to
certain billing practices.2 75 When "reduced to some practical application rendering
it 'useful,"' mathematical subject matter no longer constitutes an abstract idea.276
Whether the patented method produced any physical transformation, or whether it
was bound by physical limitations, was not the issue. 277 Although physical
limitations could distinguish a practical invention from an abstract idea, even an
invention that merely involved inputting, calculating, storing, and outputting
numbers could qualify as patentable subject matter, so long as it applied
mathematics "in a practical manner to produce a useful result." 278
V. "ABSTRACT IDEAS" IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
READJUSTING THE BALANCE

AT&T and State Street marked the high point of the idea that no invention is
an abstract idea, no matter how non-physical its subject matter, so long as it
produces a practical result. These cases were instrumental in opening the door to
patenting diverse business methods that, in their capacity to generate profits, are
undeniably practical. When the tide began to turn, the first hint of change came
from the Supreme Court.
Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite Labs 27 9 concerned a patented method of
detecting a vitamin deficiency by observing an elevated level of the amino acid
homocysteine in a patient's blood. 2 8 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
assess whether the patent claimed a principle of nature. Before the case could be
decided, the court dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.2 81 Justice Breyer,
joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented from the dismissal. Justice Breyer
noted that too much patent protection might impede, rather than foster, the
progress of technology. 282 One way in which patent law "sail[s] between [the]
opposing and risky shoals" 283 of too much or too little protection is by denying
exclusive rights to "fundamental scientific (including mathematical) and

273 Id. at 1356 ("[T]he judicially-defined proscription against patenting of a
'mathematical algorithm,' to the extent such a proscription still exists, is narrowly limited
to mathematical algorithms in the abstract.").
274 Id at 1357.
275
1 d. at 1358.
276
Id. at 1357.
277 See id. at 1358-60.
278

Id. at 1359-60.

279

548 U.S. 124 (2006).
125.

280

1 d. at

See id. at 125-26.
Id. at 127.
283 id
281

282
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technological principles."284 The opinion focuses on natural phenomena, like the
natural relationship between a vitamin deficiency and an elevated level of
homocysteine, but it offers a few insights into abstract ideas as well.
Justice Breyer admitted that categories like "abstract intellectual concepts" are
"not easy to define." 285 "After all," he wrote, "many a patentable invention rests
upon its inventor's knowledge of natural phenomena; many 'process' patents seek
to make abstract intellectual concepts workably concrete; and all conscious human
action involves a mental process."286 Moreover, such categories as the court had
enumerated are of little value in identifying the patents that would harm or help
technological advancement.287 This patent, however, failed the narrowest
interpretation of the doctrine that denies patents to phenomena of nature. 2 8 8 Justice
Breyer's conclusion depends on his repudiation of the Alappat notion that an
invention is patentable so long as it produces "a useful, concrete and tangible
result." 2 89 The Supreme Court, he wrote, had "never made such a statement" and
the language, "if taken literally," would contradict a number of the Court's
decisions. 2 90 One of these is the Morse decision. Sending messages over long
distances is "a result that seems 'useful, concrete and tangible,"' yet Morse's claim
had been denied.29' Similarly, in Benson, the court had invalidated a computerprogramming method that was "useful, concrete and at least arguably (within the
computer's wiring system) tangible."29 2 Usefulness, in Justice Breyer's view, is not
the fixed star by which to navigate the "risky shoals" of patentable subject
matter. 293
Section A, which follows, discusses the subsequent Federal Circuit cases that
restricted the patentability of intangible subject matter, no matter how useful it
may be. Section B examines the landmark Bilski case, in which those restrictions
were endorsed by the Federal Circuit en banc, only to be struck down by the
Supreme Court in favor of the traditional exclusion of patents to "abstract ideas."

Id. (quoting W.

R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 305 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2
1Id. at 134.
284

LANDEs

&

id.
7id.
288 Id. at 135.
286

28

28 9

In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

290 Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 136.
291 Id. at 136-37.

292 Id. at 137.
293 Id. at 127.
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A. IntangiblesRevisited

Justice Breyer, in his Lab. Corp. opinion, did not speak for the majority of the
Supreme Court, but his message was heard. Soon the Federal Circuit began to pull
back from its more liberal, utility-oriented views on patentable subject matter. The
applicant in In re Nuiften294 invented a technique for encoding a signal with a
minimally intrusive "watermark" that one could use to identify the origins of a
copyrighted sound or video recording.295 The PTO allowed claims to the method of
encoding the watermark, but rejected claims to "a signal" that had been subjected
to the technique.2 96 The PTO Board29 7 held that a "signal" did not fall within any of
the statutory classes of patentable subject matter, and having no physical attributes,
it constituted an abstract idea.2 98 A divided Federal Circuit panel affirmed.299
Although a signal must take some physical form in order to be transmitted or
received, the claims did not specify the medium of transmission or any other
physical constraints. 3 00 The majority held that the four statutory categories of
patentable subject matter-process, machine, manufacture, and composition of
matter-define "the exclusive reach of patentable subject matter"; no invention
outside of those categories can be patented, no matter how useful it may be. 3 0 1
The majority did not address whether the encoded signal was an abstract idea.
However, Judge Linn, who advocated a more expansive definition of
"manufacture," 302 concluded that it was not abstract. For Judge Linn, the issue of

500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1348-49.
6
11 See id. at 1351.
297 The PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (PTO Board) reviews
decisions rendered by patent examiners. The Board's decisions may be appealed directly to
Circuit.
the Federal
29 8
1 d. at 1351-52.
29 9
1 d. at 1357.
300 Id. at 1353.
30' Id. at 1354. A signal is not a "process," but a "thing." Id. at 1355. It is not a
"machine," a term that applies to concrete devices consisting of mechanical components,
and it is not a "composition of matter." Id. at 1355-57. Whether a signal qualifies as a
"manufacture" is a more difficult question, because signals are "man-made." Id. at 1356.
However, not everything that is artificial is a "manufacture." Id. A "manufacture" is an
"article" created by giving new form to raw materials; it refers to "tangible articles or
commodities." Id. Manufactures do not include transient phenomena like signals, even if
they are "man-made and physical," and even if they "exist[] in the real world and [have]
tangible causes and effects." Id. Whether the signal could be called "useful, concrete and
tangible" was beside the point. That language had been used, in Alappat and in State Street,
in connection with patentable machines, and in AT&T in connection with a patentable
process, but here the claimed invention was neither. See id. at 1356 n.7.
302 Judge Linn did not agree that manufactures are limited to "non-transitory, tangible
things." Id. at 1358 (Lynn, J., dissenting in part). The signal described in the claim required
294

295 See id. at

THE PARADOX OF "ABSTRACT IDEAS"

2011

831

abstractness arises from the requirement that a patented invention be "new and
useful." 303 "[A]bstract truths" are not patentable because they are not "made by
man." 304 They are not "new" but "timeless"-an observation that Judge Linn
extends not only to natural phenomena but also to abstract relationships, like the
"timeless mathematical relationship among integers" at the heart of Benson's
unpatentable algorithm.305 At the same time, an abstract idea is too far removed
from practical application to be "useful."306 Nuijten's "signal," wrote Judge Linn,
was not abstract because it was man-made, because it was not a timeless truth, and
because it had a specific utility. 3 07
On the same day that it decided Nuiten, the Federal Circuit released its first
Comiskey opinion.30 8 The invention in Comiskey was a method of providing
3 09
binding arbitration in connection with legal documents like contracts or willS.
The court held the method unpatentable based, in part, on the re-discovered
doctrine that "mental processes-or processes of human thinking" are not
patentable subject matter.3 10 Comiskey is a confusing opinion that makes little
attempt to distinguish between mental processes, algorithms, and abstract ideasas though they were necessarily interchangeable." Much of the court's reasoning
some physical dimension, and whether it took the form of "a pulse of energy or a stone
tablet," it must be given "new form" when encoded. Id. "The resulting signal is thus a
'manufacture' in the 'expansive' sense of § 101." Id. In Judge Linn's view, "Congress has
consistently intended statutory subject matter to cover the full scope of technological
ingenuity, however it might best be claimed." Id. at 1362.
303

See id. at 1363.

304 Id. at

1364. Judge Linn wrote:

Certain innovations, no matter how new to human thought, are not the type of
technological invention to which Congress has extended patent protection, but
instead are considered to be abstract truths that were not 'made by man.' . . .
This insight, I believe, is at the core of the judicial doctrine by which laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are excluded from patentable
subject matter.
Id.

id.
Id. at 1365 ("[A]lthough mathematical algorithms and similarly abstract principles
may be useful (in the casual sense of the term) in a wide variety of contexts, their utility is
too far removed from what is claimed for them to be 'useful' under § 101.").
305

306

307

See id. at 1368-69.

499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Federal Circuit en banc later vacated the first
Comiskey opinion. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc). The
passages discussed here are unchanged in the substituted opinion.
308

309

Cominsky, 499 F.3d at 970-71.

554 F.3d at 979. If Musgrave had suggested otherwise, it had later been
"significantly cabined by Benson." Id. at 980 n.15.
311 The court first discusses abstract ideas, then shifts, with little transition, to mental
processes. See id at 977-79 (moving from a generalized discussion of abstract ideas to
claims involving both "a mental process" and something more concrete, such as a machine,
310
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relies on the premise that only inventions in the "useful arts" can be patented.312
Purely mental processes-a species of, or synonymous with, abstract ideasexceed those limits, even when they have practical applications. In other words,
the useful arts limitation, offered in Musgrave as a substitute for the mental steps
doctrine, now justifies its resurrection:
It is thus clear that the present statute does not allow patents to be
issued on particular business systems-such as a particular type of
arbitration-that depend entirely on the use of mental processes. In other
words, the patent statute does not allow patents on particular systems that
depend for their operation on human intelligence alone, a field of
endeavor that both the framers and Congress intended to be beyond the
reach of patentable subject matter. Thus, it is established that the
application of human intelligence to the solution of practical problems is
not in and of itself patentable.313
The Supreme Court had rejected a "purely literal reading" of the categories of
patentable subject matter enumerated in § 101.314 Specifically, its exclusion of
abstract ideas had been "repeatedly . . . confirmed."3 15 Yet the court's discussion of
abstract ideas is regrettably obscure. The prohibition, writes the Court, has "two
distinct (though related) aspects." 1 6 One bars patents to abstract concepts that have
"no claimed practical application."" For this proposition, the Court cites RubberTip Pencil and Benson. The Court cannot mean concepts having no practical
application at all (a pencil eraser is a practical application, as are the numerous
potential uses of Benson's mathematical algorithm), but rather concepts that are
not limited by the claims to any particularapplication. 3 18 The second "aspect"
concerns abstract ideas in the context of industrial processes. A process claim
involving an "abstract concept" is patentable subject matter if it is "tied to a
particular apparatus" or if it "operate[s] to change materials to 'a different state or
thing."' 31 9 What the Court means by "abstract concept" in this context is even less
manufacture or composition of matter). In note 12, the court refers to "process claims not
limited to claiming an abstract concept or algorithm (i.e., a mental process)"--the "i.e."
suggesting that the categories are identical. Id. at 978 n. 12. The court relies in part on cases
like Benson that list mental processes as unpatentable subject matter but that tell us little
about them, other than to suggest, by their separate listing, that mental processes and
abstract ideas are not coextensive.
12 ld. at 977.
13
1 Id. at 980.
314 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
311
3 17

318

Id. at 1376.
Id.
See id. (referring to the preemptive effect of the claim in Benson, which had not

been limited to "any particular end use").
319

Id.
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clear. Apparently it means processes, like mental processes and mathematical
algorithms, that are symbolic or non-physical even when put to specific use. 3 2 0
These are not patentable subject matter in themselves. They may, however, be a
part of a patentable process that also involves physical things, as the Arrhenius
equation can be a part of a patentable process for curing rubber.32 1 Physicality
appears to be essential; usefulness alone does not make an abstract concept, like a
thought process, patentable. 32 2
B. Bilski and Beyond
Comiskey led the way to the landmark case In re Bilski.323 The applicants in
324
A
Bilski claimed a method of managing risk in commodities transactions.
middleman would pair buyers and sellers with fixed-rate contracts, protecting the
buyer against the risk of rising prices and the seller against the risk of falling
prices.32 5 Claim 1 described steps of "identifying market participants" and
"initiating . . . transactions." 326 The method applied to any commodity that might
be traded, or even options to purchase commodities. 327 The PTO Board, affirming
the actions of the patent examiner, rejected the claim as "an abstract idea ineligible
for patent protection." 32 8 A divided Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed.
As in Comiskey, the decision turned on the meaning of "process" in the
context of § 101. If an application claimed a "fundamental principle"-a category
that includes abstract ideaS329-then it did not claim a patentable "process." The
question, said the court, comes down to preemption; a process claim that preempts
every use of a fundamental principle is unpatentable, 330 because it is a patent on the

This interpretation seems to explain the footnote where the court states "[o]f
course, process claims not limited to claiming an abstract concept or algorithm (i.e., a
mental process) may not be subject to the same requirements." Id. at 1377 n. 12.
320

321

See id. at 1377.

See id. ("[Miental processes-or processes of human thinking-standing alone are
not patentable even if they have practical application."). The court explained AT&T, State
Street, and Arrhythmia as cases in which processes involving algorithms were limited to
practical applications and "tied to specific machines." Id. at 1377 & n. 14.
323 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
324
Id. at 949.
322

325

326

327
328
329
330

Id. at 949-50.
Id. at 949.
See id. at 950.
Id.
Id. at 952 & n.5.

The court wrote:

Diehr can be understood to suggest that whether a claim is drawn only to a
fundamental principle is essentially an inquiry into the scope of that exclusion;
i.e., whether the effect of allowing the claim would be to allow the patentee to
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principle itself.331 How does one identify that sweeping preemption? 332 The
Supreme Court had supplied a "definitive test" to determine if a process claim
involving a fundamental principle covers only a patentable application of that
principle, or the principle itself.33 3 This test, which the Federal Circuit called the
"machine-or-transformation test," 3 3 4 holds that a process is patentable subject
matter if "(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing." 335 While the Supreme Court might
someday devise other tests to guard against granting exclusive rights to
fundamental principles, for now this was the sole test to use in determining if a
process claim is eligible for patenting.3 36
The "transformation" aspect of the test required some elaboration. What if the
"article" transformed by the process is not a physical substance, but something
more symbolic? As the court recognized, "[t]he raw materials of many
information-age processes .. . are electronic signals and electronically-manipulated
data." 37 Some business methods "involve the manipulation of even more abstract
constructs such as legal obligations, organizational relationships, and business
risks." 33 8 The adequacy of data transformation to delimit patentable subject matter
depends on what the data represents. Methods that transform data representing
pre-empt substantially all uses of that fundamental principle. If so, the claim is
not drawn to patent-eligible subject matter.
Id. at 953. If the "fundamental principle" has limited utility, then a more limited claim has
the necessary preemptive effect. In Benson, for example, the algorithm had no utility
except in connection with a computer. Hence, the claim limiting its use to a computer "did
not reduce the preemptive footprint of the claim since all uses of the algorithm were still
covered by the claim." Id at 955.
331 Preemption, the court argued, is not the ultimate problem, but a symptom of a
claim that seeks to patent a fundamental principle. Id. at 957 ("Preemption is merely an
indication that a claim seeks to cover a fundamental principle itself rather than only a
specific application of that principle."). Preemption of all uses in one field suggests, as
much as preemption of all uses in all fields, that the patent claims a principle in the abstract
rather than an application of the principle. Id.
332 The court noted that "the more challenging process claims of the twenty-first
century are seldom so clearly limited in scope as the highly specific, plainly corporeal
industrial manufacturing process of Diehr; nor are they typically as broadly claimed or
purely abstract and mathematical as the algorithm of Benson." Id. at 954.
333 id
334 See id. at 955.
3 Id. at 954. The association of the process with a particular machine, or its use to
transform an article into a different state or thing, must impose "meaningful limits" on the
scope of the claim. Id. at 961. "[I]nsignificant extra-solution activity" does not suffice. Id
at 962.. "Transforming" a piece of paper by printing on it the solution to a mathematical
calculation is an example of "insignificant extra-solution activity."
336 Id.at
33
1 Id. at
38id.

956.

962.
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physical and tangible objects (e.g., data representing the rhythms of a beating
heart) are limited enough that they do not threaten preemption of a fundamental
principle.339 Methods that operate on other sorts of data may compel a different
result.
The method at issue was not a patentable process because it was not tied to a
particular machine, and it did not transform an article into a different state or
thing. 340 The only transformation involved "simply . . . public or private legal
obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions."3 ' These
are not "physical objects or substances," nor are they "representative of physical
objects or substances."3 42 The claimed method, on the contrary, encompassed a
mental process that would "effectively pre-empt any application of the
fundamental concept of hedging," at least in the field of consumable
commodities.343
Embracing the "machine-or-transformation test" as the sole test of a
patentable process, the court rejected alternative tests of patentable subject matter.
Following Justice Breyer's lead in Lab. Corp., the court declared that a "useful,
concrete and tangible result" was, at best, a "useful indication[] of whether a claim
is drawn to a fundamental principle or a practical application of such a
principle." 34 4 As a substitute for the machine-or-transformation test, it was
"inadequate." 34 5 Nor did the court endorse the "technological arts" test suggested
in Comiskey and Musgrave. Because the term "technological arts" is "both
ambiguous and ever-changing," the . "contours of such a test . . . would be

unclear." 346 The court also declined to adopt categorical exclusions for business
methods or any other kind of invention not already identified by the Supreme
Court as unpatentable subject matter.347 Finally, the court disavowed a "possible
misunderstanding" of Comiskey that would bar patents to mental processes without
"significant physical steps."348 In short, as far as processes are concerned, the
majority placed all of its eggs in the "machine-or-transformation" basket.
The decision prompted two concurring opinions and two dissents. Notably,
Judge Rader argued that a single sentence could have been substituted for the
majority's elaborate disquisition: "Because Bilski claims merely an abstract idea,
this court affirms the Board's rejection." 34 9 The only limits on patentable subject
matter, he wrote, are those identified by the Supreme Court-natural laws, natural

339
340
341
342

343
4

Id. at 962-63.
Id. at 963.
id
Id.

Id. at 965-66.
Id. at 959.

345 Id. at 960.
346

Id.

347

id

348

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

349 Id. at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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phenomena, and abstract ideas. 3 50 Natural laws and phenomena are not patentable
subject matter because "they cannot be invented at all";3 5 abstract ideas are not
patentable subject matter because they are not useful as such.352 Bilski's method of
hedging risk in commodities transactions presented "a classic example of
abstractness," either "a vague economic concept or obvious on its face." 353 Judge

Newman, who agreed that abstract ideas are "fundamental truths" that cannot be
patented,3 54 concluded that Bilski's method of hedging risk was not an abstract
idea, apparently because it included enough "details and limitations" to distinguish
3
it from a "fundamental truth." 1
As the Bilski decision awaited review by the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit decided In re Ferguson.3 56 Ferguson concerned a "paradigm" for marketing

software from a number of independent companies through a single marketing
entity. 35 7 Ferguson's method claims failed the machine-or-transformation test,358

350

Id. at 1012 (Rader, J., dissenting).

Id. at 1013 (Rader, J., dissenting). "After all, God or Allah or Jahveh or Vishnu or
the Great Spirit provided these laws and phenomena as humanity's common heritage." Id.
351

352

d.

Id. Obviousness plays an uncertain role in Judge Rader's conclusion that hedging
is an abstract idea. "Hedging," he observes, "is a fundamental economic practice long
prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance class." Id.
Perhaps the familiar place of hedging in school curricula simply demonstrates that it is a
"fundamental" concept.
3

354
3

Id. at 977 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 997 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman wrote:

Bilski's process for determining risk in commodity transactions does not

become an abstraction because it is broadly claimed in his first claim. It may be
claimed so broadly that it reads on the prior art, but it is neither a fundamental
truth nor an abstraction. Bilski's ten other claims contain further details and
limitations, removing them farther from abstraction.
Id.

356

558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The court also decided Prometheus Labs., Inc. v.

Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), a case reminiscent of Lab.
Corp. Here the patented method was a process for optimizing the administration of a drug
by monitoring metabolites in the patient's blood. Id. at 1339. The measured levels
"indicate[d] a need to increase or decrease the level of drug to be administered so as to
minimize toxicity and maximize efficacy." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
defendant argued that the patents claimed a natural phenomenon, constituting the natural
correlation between the metabolite levels and the efficacy (and toxicity) of the drug that
had been administered. Id. at 1340-41. The Federal Circuit disagreed. The court found that
the claims were not drawn to a natural principle or an abstract idea; the patented method
passed the "machine-or-transformation test" because administering the drug "transformed"
the patient's body physically and chemically. See id. at 1345-46.
357 See In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d at 1361.
35 8 Id

at 1363-65.
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and claims to the "paradigm" fell within none of the statutory categories of
§ 101.3 5 9 In fact, the "paradigm" claims describing "a business model for an
intangible marketing company" constituted "quite literally . . . the paradigmatic

abstract idea." 360 Disagreeing with Judge Newman, who found the claims "not at
all abstract" because they were "definite and concrete and limited," 36 1the majority
explained that "there is nothing definite or concrete about Ferguson's marketing
paradigm." 3 62 It involved only "legal obligations, organizational relationships, and
business risks," the kind of non-physical entities identified in Bilski as "abstract
constructs." 363
The Supreme Court issued its own Bilski decision in 20 10,364 affirming the
decision of the Federal Circuit on different grounds. 36 5 The Court repeated the
well-known exceptions to patentable subject matter-"laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas."366 Conceding that these exceptions are not found
in the statute, the Court held the exceptions "consistent with the notion that a
patentable process must be new and useful." 36 7 They each represent "part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men ... free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none." 368 Bilski's method of hedging risk could not be patented because it was an
abstract idea, much like the mathematical algorithms discussed in Benson and
Flook. 36 9 Hedging was a "fundamental economic practice," and Bilski's claims
would preempt its use. 37 0
The Court did not endorse the "machine-or-transformation test" as the sole
measure of a patentable process; it was "not intended to be an exhaustive or
exclusive test," but merely "a useful and important clue."371 It was a test adapted to

3 59

Id. at 1365-66.
Id. at 1366 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The applicants
"conceded during oral argument, 'you cannot touch the company."' Id. "Tangible" now
refers to physical things that can be touched, whereas in State Street, in the context of a
"useful, concrete and tangible result" involving mutual fund management, "tangible" meant
something quite different.
361 Id. at 1367 (Newman, J., concurring). Judge Newman found the marketing method
"not an abstraction, even in Bilski terms" because it did not "pre-empt all uses of a
fundamental principle." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
362 Id. at 1366 n.6.
363 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
36
1 Id. at 3230.
366 Id. at 3225 (internal quotation marks omitted).
367 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
368 Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
369 Id. at 3231.
370 Id. Bilski's broadest claim would preempt the use of his hedging technique in any
field. Those that limited its use to the commodities or energy markets were also
unpatentable under Flook. Id.
371 Id. at 3226-27.
360
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industrial age inventions "grounded in a physical or other tangible form," but less
suited to the information age, an age of "new technologies .

.

. call[ing] for new

inquiries."372 The Court was also unwilling to exclude, categorically, methods of
doing business, 3 73 though it invited the Federal Circuit to define a subset of
business methods that represent only abstract ideas.374 In the end, the Bilski
opinion is one of calculated circurmispection. It endorses no tests, strikes no
balances, and leaves us with little more than the age-old proscription against
patenting abstract ideas.
Justice Stevens, who with three other Justices would have ruled unpatentable
all business methods, agreed that Bilski sought to patent an abstract idea,375 but he
found the majority's explanation inadequate. According to Justice Stevens, Bilski's
patent application did not claim "the sort of phenomenon of nature or abstract idea
that was embodied by the mathematical formula at issue in [Benson] and in
Flook."3 76 It did not claim "a principle, in the abstract, or a fundamental truth."377
Bilski's process was not an abstract idea merely because it was generally
described,378 and whether hedging was a well-known practice was irrelevant. 37 9 As
Justice Stevens sums up the majority opinion:
The Court . . . never provides a satisfying account of what

constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea. Indeed, the court does not even
explain if it is using the machine-or-transformation criteria. The Court
essentially asserts its conclusion that petitioner's application claims an
abstract idea. This mode of analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the
correct outcome in this case, but it also means that the Court's musings
on this issue stand for very little.380
Subsequently, the Federal Circuit took up abstractness again in Research
Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,3 8 1 a case involving methods of
improving the quality of halftone images.382 Citing Justice Steven's lament that
Bilski provided no "satisfying account" of an abstract idea, Judge Rader, more

Id. at 3227. The Court did not, however, decide whether the technologies of the
information age should, in the end, be patentable. Id.
373 Id. at 3228-29.
374
Id. at 3229.
31 Id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring).
376 id.
372

Id. (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because of these statements, it is difficult to understand why Justice Stevens
37

agreed that Bilski claimed an "abstract idea."
378 id.
3

Id. at 3236.

380

id.
627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 862.

38
382
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diplomatically, writes that "[t]he Supreme Court did not presume to provide a rigid
formula or definition of abstractness."38 3 Following suit, the Federal Circuit panel
also declined to define abstractness "beyond the recognition that this disqualifying
characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory
categories of eligible subject matter and the statutory context that directs primary
attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act." 3 84 Although the
patented method employed mathematical equations, the court did not find the
invention abstract. On the contrary, it offered "functional and palpable applications
in the field of computer technology."3 85 Some claims required tangible elementslike printers and memory-and the invention as a whole represented an
improvement of technologies already available. The court described the abstract
ideas exception as a "coarse . . . filter," to be applied only in cases where the

invention is "manifestly abstract," 387 leaving problems of indefiniteness or
inadequate disclosure to other tools provided in the patent statute.
VI. THE CONCRETE DILEMMA OF "ABSTRACT IDEAS"
In 1874, the Supreme Court wrote in Rubber-Tip Pencil that "[a]n idea of
itself is not patentable"-planting a seed in dicta that flourished in subsequent
opinions, growing at last into a thicket of obscurity.388 Almost a century later, the
Benson Court restated the concept with the same disarming simplicity: "It is
conceded that one may not patent an idea."3 89 Yet the subject matter of a patent is
an invention, and an invention is an "idea"-a point brought home in recent
Supreme Court decisions.
An invention begins with a "conception." Conception means the "formation in
the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and
operative invention." 390 The invention is "reduced to practice" when reduced to a
tangible embodiment.39 1 If it is a machine, it is reduced to practice when a
prototype is built; if a process, it is reduced to a practice when the steps of the
method are performed. 3 92 But, as the Supreme Court stated in Pfaff v. Wells
Electronics,Inc., "[t]he primary meaning of the word 'invention' in the Patent Act

383

Id. at 868.

384 id.
385

Id.

Id. at 869.
387

id.

381

87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874).
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).

389

390 Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Hedrick, 537 F.3d 1290, 1297-98 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
391 ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAw ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 101 (3d ed.

2009).

392

See id.
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unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception rather than to a physical
embodiment of that idea."3 93
The invention is an "idea," and the patent claims that reduce it to words
cannot reproduce the idea perfectly: "Unfortunately, the nature of language makes
it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application." 3 94
Describing an invention with a limited vocabulary produces "unintended idea
gaps."3 9 5 For that reason, the doctrine of equivalents discussed in Winans 39 6 lives
on, and "[t]he scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead
embraces all equivalents to the claims described." 39 7 In other words, even the
claims, generally said to define the "metes and bounds" of the invention, are
secondary to the idea they represent. 398
So when the Court said in Benson that "one may not patent an idea," it did not
mean any idea. It must have meant an abstract idea, or what Rubber-Tip Pencil
called "[a]n idea of itself."399 How, then, are abstract ideas distinguished from
patentable ideas? In Bilski, the Court's interpretation of the Patent Act emphasized
the importance of giving terms their "ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning."4oo Although the term "abstract" appears only in judicial opinions, it is
worth considering the ordinary meaning of the word.
The Second Edition of Webster's New International Dictionary, used in the
Bilski decision for its definition of "method,"401 includes several definitions of
"abstract." 402 "Abstract" comes from the Latin abstrahere,meaning to draw from,
or separate.40 3 Relevant definitions include: "considered apart from any application
to a particular object"; and "expressing a property, quality or attribute apart from
any object or thing; as, 'honesty,' 'whiteness,' 'triangularity' are abstract

393 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998); see also Stem v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 434 F.3d
1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[C]onception is the touchstone of inventorship." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
394 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
395 Id. (quoting Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum
Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 29, 31-32 (2005) (referring to the difficulty
of "mapping words to things").
3 See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text for discussion of doctrine of
equivalents addressed in Winans.
397 Festo, 535 U.S. at 732.
398 Burk & Lemley distinguish between the claims of a patent and the "actual
invention," suggesting the latter as a guide for interpreting ambiguous claims. See Burk &
Lemley, supra note 395, at 32.
39 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874).
400 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
401 Id. at 3228.
402 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 10 (2d
ed. 1954).
403

id
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words." 40 4 The same dictionary defines "abstraction" as an "[a]ct or process of
leaving out of consideration one or more qualities of a complex object so as to
attend to others. Thus, when the mind considers the form of a tree by itself, or the
color of the leaves as separate from their size or figure, the act is called
abstraction."405

Unfortunately, the abstractness described in the dictionary sounds very much
like the abstractness that is a part of any invention. In fact, the process of
abstraction-the mental separation of qualities from their manifestation in concrete
things-is a critical part of the act of conception. Let us consider a hypothetical, to
see how abstraction and invention go hand-in-hand.
A. An Abstraction Hypothetical

Smith and Jones operate a commercial bakery that supplies grocers with
sliced bread. To date, the machinery that slices fresh loaves has employed straightedged blades; no slicing implement other than the straight blade is known to
commercial bakers, home chefs, or anyone else. Because of the inefficient sawing
action of the straight edge, the slicing process slightly crushes the bread, resulting
in many misshapen and unsalable loaves. Profits would rise if the loaves held their
shape, but neither Smith, nor anyone else, knows how to accomplish this. One day,
as he is speaking to a customer on the telephone, Smith holds a tool used to apply
decorative grooves to cake icing. It has a serrated edge. Smith absent-mindedly
brushes the tool against the top of a bread loaf still warm from the oven. The
conversation concluded, Smith notices that even with minimal downward pressure
he has managed to open a neat incision in the bread. Smith imagines the solution to
his problem-commercial bread-slicing machines employing serrated blades.
There are still questions to be answered. How should the slicing machines be
adapted to use serrated blades? How quickly should the blades move, and with
what downward pressure? At what temperature should the loaves be sliced? Some
of these questions Smith answers by contemplating the problem and applying his
expertise, others by experimenting until he sees success. Finally, Smith designs a
practical bread-slicing machine. He builds the machine, tests it, and finds that it
works. Conception and reduction to practice are complete.
Smith now prepares a patent application. For the first time, Smith searches for
language to describe his invention. As he designed his prototype, Smith's thoughts
often ran from the general to the specific; he had goals to achieve and devised

Id. Of potential interest in the patent law context is the definition of "abstract" as
"[d]ealing with a subject in the abstract or dealing with an abstract subject;-applied to
sciences, esp. to the pure as distinguished from the applied sciences." Id. In the same spirit,
404

the dictionary defines "abstract noun" as, in grammar, "a noun denoting an attribute, as a

quality, activity, or state, considered apart from its substance or that which manifests the
activity, state, or condition (sweetness, wisdom, motion)." Id.
405 id.
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specific means to achieve them. As he drafts his patent claims, his thoughts
sometimes run in the other direction. In his first attempts at claim language, he
describes a serrated edge with just the spacing and geometry of his prototype
blade. But Smith does not want claims easily evaded by minor changes, nor does
he want to rely on the doctrine of equivalents if he can avoid it. Smith considers
which aspects of the blade geometry are essential and which are not, and his
application evolves as he pares away, from his broadest claims, the unnecessary
limitations. This process is more than simply translating a completed idea into
claim language; perhaps Smith does not truly understand his invention until he has
contemplated it in terms of its essential elements.
Smith considers various approaches to claiming his invention. One is to claim
the product of his ingenuity-sliced bread. This would be a valuable claim because
of its breadth, but it is too broad to avoid the prior art. Sliced bread had been
available before Smith came along. Instead, Smith claims perfectly sliced bread,
defined as bread cut consistently and on an industrial scale with minimal
deformation of the loaves. Until Smith's invention, perfectly sliced bread was
unknown. With this claim, Smith can avoid, during the term of his patent,
competition from means later developed for achieving the same desirable resultsperhaps bread-slicing machines that employ lasers instead of serrated blades.
Smith also drafts apparatus claims. He uses terms as general as possible in
some claims, and, as protection against unknown prior art, Smith drafts narrower
claims too. He cannot claim the serrated edge in isolation, because we know from
his own story that serrated tools already existed. Section 112, T 6 of the Patent Act
allows claim elements to be expressed as "means" for performing a function,
without specifying a specific structure to accomplish that function.40 6 Some of
Smith's apparatus claims include "means to hold the loaf in place during slicing."
"Means-plus-function" elements cover structures that perform the designated
function, and that are identical or equivalent to the corresponding structure
disclosed in the patent specification.40 7 Smith's specification shows a metal bracket
holding the loaf in place during slicing, so his means-plus-function claims cover
bread-slicing machines with equivalent structures. This helps Smith in his search
for language adequate to capture the essence of his invention, but it leaves him
vulnerable to a decision by a court that a structure performing the same function is
not equivalent.
Process claims are best suited to capture what Smith considers important-not
the particular machinery he has built, but the perfectly sliced loaves that he can
sell. Smith describes his process as a series of steps, including the back-and-forth
motion of the blades, their downward movement, their withdrawal from the sliced
loaves, and so forth. As Smith searches for language to describe his process, he
again considers which details are unnecessarily limiting and best omitted. Yet he

406
407

See 35 U.S.C. §112 (2006).
See Nomos Corp. v. Brainlab USA, Inc., 357 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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must not describe his process so generally that it includes the use of the straightedged machinery already known.
Meanwhile, Jones, co-owner of the Smith & Jones Bakery, produces an
insight of her own. She has observed that unsold bread sometimes accumulates in
the warehouse, while at other times the factory cannot fill all of its last-minute
orders. She believes that variations in demand are largely seasonal and repeat
themselves every year. Jones pores over sales records from previous years and
produces a curve illustrating the historical demand for each variety of bread during
each week of the year. In order to project future demand for bread, Jones multiplies
the historic demand by a factor based on the growing population of the area served
by the bakery and a figure related to economic conditions generally. Jones uses this
prediction to increase the efficiency of the bakery by having extra supplies and
workers on hand when demand for particular varieties of bread requires it.
Jones decides to patent her own invention. Like Smith, she searches for
language to capture her insights, and she contemplates which limitations are
essential and which are not. Could some other multiplier be used to factor in
economic circumstances? Could her general technique apply to commodities other
than bread? Jones prepares process claims describing a series of steps to adjust
production according to predicted seasonal demands. Because a computer is the
means by which she implements her method, Jones also drafts apparatus claims
describing a hardware "system" programmed to perform the required calculations.
Some claims end with the calculation, others with action taken to modify orders for
raw materials.
B. The Varieties ofAbstraction
All of Smith's and Jones' patent claims are abstract in the dictionary sense.
They separate the essential qualities of the inventive idea from their concrete
realizations-the prototype bread slicer in Smith's case, the implemented
inventory control plan in Jones' case. The blade in Smith's prototype may be six
feet long and forged of stainless steel, but if those qualities are unnecessary to
define the invention or avoid the prior art, Smith will separate them from the
attributes that do matter.
Abstractness is an inherent quality of patent claims because claims describe
classes of things. Smith's claimed invention is not a particular bread slicer, but the
class of all bread slicers sharing the specified attributes. Although the blade of a
particular slicer could be made of brass, ceramic, plastic, or materials later
invented, the device will still infringe Smith's claim if it has the properties set forth
as defining the class of infringing machines. Abstractness is not only a quality of
patent claims, it is a characteristic of the invention the claims represent. Smith's
insight is not fully embodied in the prototype he built. The machine represents
choices-like the choice of a steel blade rather than a ceramic blade-that Smith
knows could have been different without materially changing the principle at work.
Even if Smith were not forced to reduce his insights into language or precisely
delimit a class of infringing bread-slicers, his invention would still have an abstract
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quality. It would still be something he could contemplate without regard to the
concrete attributes of any particular machine. Similarly, Jones' invention is one
that could be applied to production of sour dough bread, pumpernickel or, for that
matter, any product with seasonally varying demand. Abstractness is a quality of
any patented invention.
Some claims are abstract in ways that others are not. They describe timeless
principles that have always existed, or generalized concepts with no practical
utility. They define the rights of the patentee too broadly, or they deny researchers
their "basic tools." They describe thought processes, or other matters without
physical qualities. But claims may be abstract in some of these respects without
being abstract in all. In spite of so many court decisions confirming the
unpatentability of abstract ideas, it is still not clear which of these attributes we are
looking for, or whether patentable subject matter is the right way to deal with these
concerns. In Justice Stevens' words, we still have no "satisfying account" of
abstract ideas.
1. Principles That Were Not Invented
Suppose Smith's claims discussed the molecular bonds characteristic of a
bread loaf rather than the machine he had invented for slicing it. Even if Smith's
insights into bread chemistry were unknown, valuable, and critical to the success
of his machine, he must claim the machine rather than the chemistry itself. This is
nothing more than the principle/application distinction discussed as far back as Le
Roy. The clearest reason to deny patents to natural principles is not because these
principles are abstract, but because they are not invented. Although § 102 of the
Patent Act contemplates novelty in terms of prior human activity, § 101 also
requires that a patented invention be "new." 408
To deny Smith a claim to principles of chemistry, we do not need to rely on
abstractness. A natural principle described in the most limited and concrete terms
would still be unpatentable because it is not an invention, a point reflected in the
separate listing of natural principles and abstract ideas in the usual litany of
unpatentable subject matter. 4 09 There are many intriguing questions surrounding
natural principles and phenomena. For example, is the physics of a loaf undergoing
slicing by a serrated edge a natural phenomenon if it did not occur in nature until
Smith supplied the blade? But these issues are not clarified by confusing them with
abstractness, and the host of other issues that abstractness suggests.
Most ideas labeled by the courts as "abstract" are human inventions. Hedging
financial risk is not a timeless process found in nature, nor is calculating the best

U.S.C. §§ 101-102.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). If Jones claimed the seasonally
varying demand for bread, her claim might be harder to dismiss as a natural principle. The
demand for bread is a human-created phenomenon. But the principle is the same: Jones did
not create the demand for bread, she merely observed it.
408 35

409
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price to be obtained at an auction, or selling software through a common marketing
entity. Some abstract ideas correspond to natural phenomena, but the absence of
human agency is not the means to identify which ideas are abstract and which are
not, nor is abstractness the soundest principle for denying patents to manifestations
of nature.
2. Ideas That Are Not Useful

Another concern associated with abstract claims is lack of utility. 4 10 Here we
should distinguish between claims describing subject matter having no known
utility, and claims, like Benson's, that do not specify any particularutility. Claims
in the former category fail the utility requirement, based on § 101's demand that
inventions be "useful." 4 1 1 Some abstract ideas are not useful, just as some concrete
ideas are not useful. Both can be denied patents based on the utility requirement,
without having to categorize the invention as abstract or non-abstract. In Brenner
v. Manson,4 12 the Supreme Court held unpatentable a process of making steroids.413
Because the steroids had no known uses, the applicant did not offer the quid pro
quo expected in exchange for exclusive rights.4 14 If Smith sought to patent a
functionless blade, or Jones a worthless observation about the bread market, each
could be denied a patent on the same basis.4 15
3. Claims That Are Too Broad

More relevant to the question of abstractness is a claim that encompasses too
many useful applications, including some that may be long delayed if the patent
hinders further research.4 16 The more abstract or generalized claims become, the

See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., concurring)
("[A]bstract ideas can never qualify for patent protection because the Act intends, as
Section 101 explains, to provide 'useful' technology. An abstract idea must be applied to
(transformed into) a practical use before it qualifies for protection.").
411 35 U.S.C. § 101.
412 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
413 Id. at 532, 535-36.
410

414

415

Id. at 534.

Professor Karjala has discussed making the utility requirement a part of the

abstract ideas inquiry. See Dennis S. Karjala, DistinguishingPatent and Copyright Subject
Matter, 35 CONN. L. REv. 439, 467-68 (2003) ("It seems reasonable . . . to fold the

practical utility requirement into the subject matter exclusion for abstract ideas, in the sense
that if the specified utility cannot be objectively demonstrated to result from the claimed
invention, the invention should be treated as an unpatentable abstract idea."). "Folding in"
suggests that the absence of practical utility would not be the only measure of an abstract
idea, so this incorporation might only add to the ambiguity.
416 Steering close to contradiction, the Court in Brenner raised the same concern,
noting not only that the applicant's invention had no present value to provide a quid pro
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more difficult it is to justify the breadth of the monopoly. If Smith claimed all
methods of producing a perfectly sliced bread loaf, or Jones claimed all means of
adjusting factory output to meet varying demand, these concerns would be
genuine. Over-breadth was critical in Benson. The mathematical algorithm Benson
invented could be applied in numerous applications, from managing transportation
systems to researching legal precedent.4 17 It was critical also in Morse, where the
broadest claim would have covered any means of transmitting messages using
electromagnetism, including means not invented by the patentee.4 18
There are, however, other tools than the exclusion of abstract ideas to deal
with over-breadth. One of these is the enablement requirement of § 112,
increasingly used by the Federal Circuit to reject claims that are broader in scope
than the enabling disclosure of the patent specification. 4 19 In Sitrick v.
Dreamworks, LLC,4 20 for example, the Federal Circuit rejected claims covering a
421
system for integrating user-created images into movies and video games.
Because the patent specification only enabled application of the technology to
movies, not video games, the claim was invalid. Broad claim language, warned the
court, must be accompanied by an equally broad disclosure.422 The written
description requirement, also found in § 112 of the Patent Act, demands a
correspondence between the claimed invention and the invention described in the
specification.42 3 A claim is invalid if it is broader than the invention shown by that
description to be in the "possession" of the applicant.424 If Smith claimed all means
quo, but that the claims he sought might "block off whole areas of scientific development."
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.

See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972).
See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-13 (1854). Burk & Lemley
write that "[t]he rule against patenting abstract ideas, while couched in terms of patentable
subject matter, is really a judicial effort to restrict the permissible scope of patents and to
channel patent protection towards finished products." Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at
1642.
419 See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 942-43 (Fed. Cir.
2010); Automotive Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1378-80 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
420 Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
417
418

421
422

Id. at 1002.
Id. at 999; see also Automotive Techs. Int'l, 501 F.3d at 1285 (rejecting claims

covering a side-impact airbag activated by mechanical or electronic sensors, where the
disclosure enabled only the former implementation); Liebel-Flarsheim Co., 481 F.3d at
1380 (holding claims encompassing injectors with and without pressure jackets invalid
where the specification enabled only the former); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234,
1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[W]hen a range is claimed, there must be reasonable enablement of
the scope of the range.").
423 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
424 See In re Curtiss, 354 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Like the utility
requirement, the written description requirement denies patents to "academic theories, no
matter how groundbreaking." Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d. 1336, 1353
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of obtaining a perfectly sliced loaf, but disclosed and enabled only the serrated
edge, his claim could be rejected under the enablement and written description
requirements, without having to characterize Smith's invention as an abstract idea.
There are distinct advantages to using § 112 as the gatekeeper against overly
broad claims. The first is a more obvious tie to statutory language. Section 112
requires that a patent specification describe and enable the claimed invention;
Section 101 says nothing about abstract ideas. More fundamentally, questions of
statutory subject matter should have yes-or-no answers. An invention should be a
machine or not a machine; it should not be a machine to a certain extent, so long as
one can adequately define the term "machine." The breadth of the claim is a matter
of degree, and one better suited to analysis under § 112.
A comparison to copyright law shows why § 112 is a particularly useful tool
for addressing over-breadth. Copyright law protects an author's way of expressing
an idea.425 Expression is not limited to the precise text of the copyrighted work; if
it were, infringement could be avoided by insignificant variations.426 Expression
extends to something more general than the text.427 In a play, expression might
include plot developments, settings, character traits, and other story-telling devices
that could be substantially reproduced without verbatim copying. 28 On the other
hand, copyright law does not allow an author to protect the idea underlying the
work.429 Separating idea and expression is, as Judge Learned Hand famously
observed, an analysis involving "abstraction."
[W]hen the plagiarist does not take out a block in situ, but an abstract of
the whole, decision is more troublesome. Upon any work, and especially
upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is
about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which,
apart from their expression, his property is never extended.4 30

(Fed. Cir. 2010). In other words, it "limits patent protection to those who actually perform
the difficult work of 'invention'-that is, conceive of the complete and final invention with
all of its claimed limitations-and disclose the fruits of that effort to the public." Id.
425 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 547
(1985).
426 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1930).
427

id

See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1936);
Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 2010).
429 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
428

work of authorship extend to any idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is described,

explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."); Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 547.
430 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (citations omitted).
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Having defined the problem, Judge Hand admitted that "[n]obody has ever
been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.A 31 There is no bright line
between idea and expression, only a continuum of generality. In a particular case, a
court must decide if the similarities between the copyrighted work and allegedly
infringing work are so general in nature that copyright policy is best served by
treating those similarities as unprotectable ideas. 43 2 The policy objectives of
copyright law are much like those of patent law-to promote creativity by securing
to authors the exclusive right to their works, while avoiding property rights so
extensive that they stifle further creativity or deny the public the benefit of
valuable materials. 433 When it comes to separating idea and expression in a close
case, courts have little more than instinct to guide them.434
Patents and copyrights present the same risk of over-reaching through overgeneralizing. If an author's "expression" extends to the most basic aspects of the
work, the author's rights are too all-encompassing. Other authors are unable to
explore the same concepts in their own fashion, denying the public the benefit of
other viewpoints and other talents. A patent claim that omits too much detail has
similar effects. As the Court pointed out in Morse, a claim to all methods of
transmitting messages by electromagnetism would hamper exploration of other
means than those already invented.43 5 But patents and copyrights are different in
important respects.
Copyright interests are not claim-based. The copyrighted work is a specific
text-like the text of a novel. Abstraction enters the picture only after the
copyright owner identifies another work as substantially similar. Then a court
considers the level of abstraction at which any similarities appear, and whether
they are too general to be treated as similarities of expression. In contrast, an
inventor "abstracts" a patented invention at the outset when deciding how

431

id.

See Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537, 1539-41 (7th Cir. 1990). Burk & Lemley
describe copyright's treatment of abstraction as an exercise in "hierarchical category
sorting" to determine if the two works share a "sufficiently narrow categorical space" to
justify a finding of common expression. Burk & Lemley, supra note 395, at 35.
432

433 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546; Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540-41; Karjala, supra

note 415, at 369 ("[T]he underlying social policy goal of traditional copyright and patent
law . . . is to draw a balance between creation incentives (protection) on the one hand and

freer use by both consumers and competitors (less protection) on the other.").
434 See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 ("(A]s soon as literal appropriation ceases to be the
test, the whole matter is necessarily at large, so that, as was recently well said by a
distinguished judge, the decisions cannot help much in a new case.").
435 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854); see also Burk & Lemley,
supra note 4, at 1643 (describing the exclusion of abstract ideas as a "micro policy lever"
that "provides room for subsequent innovators to work out new implementations of the
abstract idea without fear of patent liability").
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generally to draft the claims. 4 36 The applicant controls the claim-drafting process
and determines the contents of the disclosure in the patent specification. The
disclosure is the applicant's opportunity to explain the significance of the invention
and its readiness to be applied in a variety of settings. This provides the court with
a context-a context absent in copyright-for judging the significance of the
patentee's contribution to the art, and how much work remains to be done to
realize its full implications.43 7 If Smith claimed any means to obtain perfectly
sliced bread but disclosed only the serrated blade, the court could decide that the
disclosure was too limited to support such a broad claim. Comparison of the claims
to the specification is characteristic of the enablement and description
requirements, but has little role in the subject matter inquiry of § 101. In short, the
abstract ideas exception poses an abstract question: "Is the claim too broad?"
Section 112 poses a question more concrete and more answerable: "Is the claim
too broad in comparison to the teachings of the disclosure?"
4. Basic Tools ofResearch

Abstract ideas are said to be among the "basic tools" of research that belong
in the "storehouse of knowledge of all men."4 3 8 The "basic tools" criterion is too
vague to identify an abstract idea. An engineer who designs equipment for use in
commercial bakeries might consider Smith's serrated blade a basic tool for further
development and improvement. Smith might regard the serrated blade as the
conclusion of the search. It is certainly true that patents, in the end, should
encourage technological advancement and not the reverse. But, together with the
exclusion of natural phenomena and principles, the best means of protecting the
basic tools of research from unproductive patents are the utility, enablement, and
novelty requirements.43 9

Courts may also view the invention at a more or less abstract level in deciding how
to interpret ambiguous claim language. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 387, at 31. This
exercise in "abstraction" would, however, be subsequent to, and much subtler than, the
patentee's initial decisions regarding how to characterize the invention.
437 The same context may be useful in deciding issues of infringement. See Burk &
Lemley, supra note 395, at 54 (advocating application of the doctrine of equivalents
because it "would permit the courts to pay attention to the issues that really matter in
deciding patent scope-the importance of the invention to the industry, the nature of the
technology, how this invention relates to others in producing marketable products, and the
relationship between the patentee's invention and the accused device").
438 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (citations omitted). Peter
Lee refers to abstract ideas as part of the "'raw' ingredients of creation" constituting our
436

"intellectual infrastructure." Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83

L. REv. 39, 64-65 (2007). "Open access" to such infrastructure "enhances
downstream productivity." Id. at 65.
439 35 U.S.C. § 101-103, 112 (2006).
WASH.
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If a concept is so general that no application has been discovered, the utility
requirement keeps the concept in the "storehouse of knowledge" until it is more
fully developed.44 0 If the patentee discloses a practical use, then a court can inquire
whether the disclosure fully enables the use of the concept in all of its potential
applications. The more generally the applicant claims the invention, the more
likely it is that a court will find the enabling disclosure lacking. If the applicant
claims a "basic tool" of research, an enabling disclosure of matching scope will be
hard to achieve. On the other hand, on those few occasions where the disclosure
fully enables a "basic tool" of research, the applicant's fundamental contribution
warrants a broad patent, and the "march of science" continues unabated.44 1 It may
be difficult to judge how much disclosure is necessary to warrant a broad claim,
but at least a court would be asking the right questions, rather than searching in
vain for the meaning of the term "abstract idea."
In short, some patents on abstract ideas might deny researchers tools that, for
the sake of technological progress, should be freely available. But the "basic tools"
issue does not help to identify which ideas are abstract, and the concern about
continuing research can be handled without resort to patentable subject matter.
5. Innovation without a Physical Dimension
Jones' insights into the marketplace raise issues of abstractness that Smith's

invention does not. Most inventions are reduced to practice in concrete, tangible
things. Samuel Johnson refuted Bishop Berkeley's arguments for the non-reality of
matter by applying a sharp kick to a rock.4 42 With a blow to his bread-slicing
machine, Smith could demonstrate that his invention, in one sense, is not abstract.

440

Burk & Lemley note that the abstract ideas exclusion "forces patents downstream,

away from unfinished research and toward completed products or processes more suitable
for the market." Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 1643. The utility requirement performs
the same function in cases where the discoverer of a principle has no useful applications to
offer. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1966) (employing the utility
requirement to ensure that a patent is more than a "hunting license"). The utility
requirement enforces the principle that a patent "is not a reward 'for the search, but

compensation for its successful conclusion." Id. at 536. If the inventor has developed the
idea to the point of offering practical contributions, then the issue is whether the claim
matches the scope of those contributions.
441 See Gruner, supra note 240, at 405 ("[B]reakthrough discoveries-that is,
pioneering discoveries that become category controlling discoveries upon the issuance of
patent rights-are ones that deserve the clearest and strongest patent protections to

encourage inventors to pursue and investors to back these advances that make possible a
group of downstream advances and associated societal benefits.").
442 JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 248 (Penguin Classics 2008) ("After
we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's
ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and that everything in the universe

is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is
impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered,
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Inventions involving machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, or
matter-altering processes are abstract only in the imagination. When Smith
contemplates a class of bread-slicing machines that share attributes critical to the
invention, but that are in other respects undefined, his thought process produces an
abstraction-a concept divorced from any concrete example of the machine.
Reducing his thoughts to claim language is a part of the process. Smith may
describe the shape of a serrated edge without limiting himself to a blade of any
particular material. Any description in language of a concrete thing omits details. It
is an exercise in generalizing, and an instance of, in the dictionary sense,
"abstraction." What is different about Jones' invention is that it has no physical
embodiment. It is abstract not only in contemplation, but in execution.
Jones could reduce to practice her invention by projecting a reduced demand
for pumpernickel in the summer months and communicating a smaller order for
rye flour to her supplier. Producing no concrete thing on which a realist
philosopher could stub his toe, Jones' invention resembles the marketing paradigm
of Ferguson, the arbitration system of Comiskey, and the hedging procedure of
Bilski. Inventions composed of contractual obligations, legal commitments,
thought processes, and other non-physical components have been singled out as
classic examples of abstract ideas. Although the Supreme Court in Bilski rejected
the machine-or-transformation test as the sole manner of identifying an abstract
idea, it still endorsed the test, and the connection to the physical world that it
implies, as an important "clue" or "investigative tool."4 3 So while processes that
do not involve physical things are not always "abstract ideas," they are very much
in danger of rejection under § 101.
Is that because non-physical processes raise the policy concerns associated
with abstract ideas? Not necessarily. Hedging contracts, arbitration commitments,
and market projections are human-created phenomena. They may be so basic that
they are not new, but novelty is a question distinct from patentable subject matter.
We can assume that Jones' demand calculations are so clever, or at least so
idiosyncratic, that they did not exist before she invented them. Do non-physical
processes have utility? In the ordinary sense, they do. They can increase efficiency,
conserve resources, generate wealth, or further understanding. One could redefine
"useful" to demand something more concrete, but that redefinition would require
some justification. Non-physical inventions can supply the quidpro quo necessary
to justify the patent bargain.
Are patents to non-physical processes overbroad? Not in every case. Jones
could draft her claims so narrowly that they would have little preemptive effect. A
claim limited to a method of ordering 99.009% of the rye flour used in the previous
month of June would be useless and absurd, but it would not be overbroad. Do
patents covering non-physical processes deny researchers their basic tools? Again,
not if the claims are narrow. Claims to non-physical processes may tend to be
striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, 'I refute
it thus."').
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overbroad, and share the other concerns associated with abstract ideas, but the only
thing unfailingly abstract about claims that cover non-physical processes is exactly
that-they cover non-physical processes.
Perhaps that is enough to hold them ineligible for patenting, either because a
non-physical process is not a "process" within the meaning of § 101 (a position
rejected by the Supreme Court in Bilski), or because non-physical processes are not
among the "useful arts" envisioned in the Constitution. After endorsing a "useful
arts" limitation in Comiskey,444 the Federal Circuit abandoned it as too vague in
Bilski.445 The court may wish to reconsider that, now that the Supreme Court has
rejected the more definite machine-or-transformation test in favor of the venerable,
but persistently muddled, abstract ideas exception. A useful arts test might be
difficult to apply. Some non-physical processes, like advances in computer
programming, may have the technological pedigree to pass the test. Inventions that
mix programming with business methods or other endeavors might be difficult to
categorize as technological or non-technological. In any case, labeling nonphysical processes as "abstract ideas" only confuses the issue.
In short, Smith or Jones might draft patent claims that should be summarily
denied. They might claim too broadly in comparison to their disclosures,
appropriate subject matter they did not invent, stray into fields of endeavor that are
not suitable for patenting, or describe concepts too undeveloped to have any
practical utility. But the "abstract ideas" label adds little to the analysis. The
concept has been pulled in too many directions, its inherent contradictions too
seldom recognized. Other tools are better adapted to the same goals. Perhaps the
absence in the Patent Act of any reference to "abstract ideas" is a sign of wisdom,
not oversight.
VII. CONCLUSION

After the Supreme Court's Bilski decision, the abstract ideas exception to
patentable subject matter has become an even more important gatekeeper in the
area of business methods and other intangible pursuits. The principle survives
because it reflects important policy goals-rewarding practical advancements,
tailoring the patent grant to the inventor's contribution to the art, and leaving the
door open to further improvements. But identifying an unpatentable abstract idea
has been problematic from the beginning; all patented inventions, in certain
respects, are abstract ideas. Some inventions are closer to the "timeless truths" than
others. Some hold more promise of further development. Some are claimed more
broadly in comparison to the patent disclosure. Some are less firmly connected to
the world of tangible things. But courts have too often applied the "abstract idea"
label without clarifying what we are looking for, or what, precisely, we are trying
to achieve.
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In Bilski, the Supreme Court acknowledged the need for "new inquiries" in
patent law to address the challenges of changing technology. The abstract ideas
exception is an old inquiry. It is the patent law equivalent of a time-weathered
stone, its inscription-hard to read when it was new-grown indecipherable under
the moss of intervening years. If the label must persist, the courts should at least
clarify which of the several aspects of abstractness are disqualifying, and examine
whether patentable subject matter is really the right means to address their
concerns. They might find that the Patent Act itself supplies the tools required,
making the judicially created "abstract ideas" doctrine a counterproductive
addition.

